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THE NEGLECTED HISTORY OF THE PRIOR RESTRAINT 
DOCTRINE: REDISCOVERING THE LINK BETWEEN THE 
FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 
MICHAEL 1. MEYERSON' 
INTRODUCTION 
The prior restraint doctrine is in danger. Once, Oliver Wendell Holmes 
could declare that the main purpose ofthe First Amendment was "to prevent all 
such previous restraints upon publications as had been practiced by other 
governments.,,1 But now, many respected commentators have concluded that the 
concept of prior restraints marks a "distinction without a difference.,,2 The prior 
restraint doctrine has been termed "so far removed from its historic function, so 
variously invoked and discrepantly applied, and so often deflective of sound 
understanding, that it no longer warrants use as an independent category of First 
Amendment analysis.") 
One reason for the strong antipathy toward the prior restraint doctrine is that 
it seems to justify the imposition of subsequent punishments on speech. Ever 
since Blackstone and the Sedition Act of 1798, the heavy hand of censorship has 
been defended on the basis that no "previous restraint" is involved.4 Because the 
prior restraint doctrine provides no substantive protection, it "leaves open the 
possibility that this same speech-suppressive activity might be found 
constitutional if sufficiently redesigned and recast in the form of a subsequent 
sanction."s 
• Professor of Law and Piper & Marbury Faculty Fellow, University of Baltimore School 
of Law. B.A., 1976, Hampshire College; J.D., 1979, University of Pennsylvania. Support for this 
Article was provided by the University of Baltimore School of Law Research Stipend. I would like 
to thank Eric Easton and Dan Brenner for their comments and suggestions. I also wish to thank 
Emily Greenberg, Elizabeth Rhodes, and the rest of the University of Baltimore Law School 
Library staff for their invaluable assistance. 
1. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (quoting Commonwealth v. Blanding, 
20 Mass. 304, 313 (1825». See also Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (193 I )(stating that "it 
has been generally, if not universally, considered that it is the chief purpose of the [First 
Amendment's] guaranty to prevent prior restraints upon publication"). 
2. See Marin Scordato, Distinction Without a Difference: A Reappraisal of the Doctrine 
of Prior Restraint, 68 N.C. L. REv. 1 (1989). 
3. John Calvin Jeffries, Jr., Rethinking Prior Restraint, 92 YALE LJ. 409, 437 (1983). See 
also Note, Prior Restraint-A Test of Invalidity in Free Speech Cases?, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 100\, 
1006 (1949) ("Whatever the value of the prior restraint doctrine in the past, it has outlived its 
usefulness.") (citation omitted). Not all commentators are ready to give up on the prior restraint 
doctrine. See. e.g., Vincent Blasi, Toward a Theory of Prior Restraint: The Central Linkage, 66 
MINN. L. REv. 11 (1981); Howard Hunter, Toward a Better Understanding of the Prior Restraint 
Doctrine: A Reply to Professor Mayton, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 283, 293-95 (1982). 
4. See infra text accompanying notes 113-18, 183-87. 
5. Scordato, supra note 2, at 33. See also Hans A. Linde, Courts and Censorship, 66 
MINN. L. REv. 171, 185 (1981) (stating that subsequent punishment is prior restraint for all practical 
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Unless we inhabit a legal universe where all speech is protected, though, the 
doctrine of prior restraints is essential for the protection of free speech. As soon 
as it is conceded that some speech may be punished, procedural protection 
becomes essential. With its distinguished historical pedigree, the prior restraint 
doctrine helps to preserve the murky line between protected and unprotected 
speech. Even a vigorous defense of protected speech is aided by the secondary 
shield of the prior restraint doctrine. Moreover, the doctrine serves to restrain the 
overuse of arguably permissible censorship by biased, over-eager, or insensitive 
government officials. This protection is only possible, however, if a critical 
problem is solved: "prior restraint" must be given a usable legal definition. 
Many share the frustration of Professor Harry Kalven who bemoaned in 
1971, "it is not altogether clear just what a prior restraint is or just what is the 
matter with it.'>6 Without a legal definition, "prior restraint" has frequently 
degenerated into nothing more than a "category labeL'" It is almost a game for 
purposes because "[i]ts object is to prevent publication, not to impose punishment"); Thomas R. 
Litwack, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 12 HARV. C.R.,C.L.L. REv. 519, 521 (1977){statingthat 
"[t]he threat of criminal and civil penalties can inhibit arguably protected expression from reaching 
the public just as effectively as injunctions or licensing schemes"); William T. Mayton, Toward a 
Theory of First Amendment Process: Injunctions of Speech. Subsequent Punishment. and the Costs 
of the Prior Restraint Doctrine, 67 CORNELL L. REv. 245, 276 (1982) (arguing that "subsequent 
punishment is calculated to suppress, and does indeed suppress, the publication of speech"); Martin 
H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment Theory, 70 VA. 
L. REv. 53, 54 (1984). 
A related argument is that the prior restraint doctrine injures free expression, because it 
encourages subsequent punishments which are more harmful than injunctions. As Professor 
Scordato argued: 
[B]ecause uniform, impersonal threats, while they may have less of a deterrent effect on 
any given individual, will have some influence on every individual in the regulated 
community. On the other hand, specific, personal threats, while perhaps more potent 
with respect to each targeted individual, are limited in their scope, by definition, to one, 
or at the most to a very few, such individuals. The overall societal impact of such 
specific, personal threats, given the large number of individuals in society, is quite small 
indeed. 
Scordato, supra note 2, at 14. See also Mayton, supra, at 246 (stating that "the preference for 
subsequent punishment over injunctive relief diminishes the exercise of free speech by burdening 
it with costs that seem not yet comprehended"). 
This is an intriguing argument, but it relies on the mathematically-unresolvable question of 
whether a weak threat to many impacts speech more than a strong threat to a few. One problem is 
that the extent of the different threats is unquantifiab1e, so comparison oftotal harm is impossible. 
Recognizing that both prior restraints and subsequent punishment are harmful to free expression, 
I prefer to oppose them both, and, iftruly forced to choose, prefer the security of the historically· 
based doctrine of prior restraints. 
6. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Supreme Court. 1970 Term-Foreword: Even When a Nation 
Is at War, 85 HARV. L. REv. 3, 32 (1971). 
7. Scordato, supra note 2, at 10. "[T]he category has been defined in ways that bear no 
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attorneys defending speakers to try to affix the label "prior restraint" on whatever 
law is being challenged.8 And the game can be successful. As Professor 
Laurence Tribe has noted, the Supreme Court "has often used the cry of 'prior 
restraints' not as an independent analytical framework but rather to signal 
conclusions that it has reached on other grounds.,,9 
The primary reason that there is currently no generally-accepted legal 
definition of the prior restraint doctrine comes from the fact that "[t]here exists 
no comprehensive study of its historical roots."\O In this Article, I attempt to 
conduct that comprehensive study. 
To examine the history of prior restraints, it is necessary to begin with the 
English experience, starting from before the Star Chamber and progressing 
through the American Revolution. Next, the American experience, from colonial 
times to the drafting of the First Amendment and beyond, needs to be studied. 
One important discovery I made was a wealth of forgotten Nineteenth Century 
cases from state courts recognizing and implementing protections against prior 
restraints as integral components of state constitutional provisions. 
What emerges from"this historical study is the surprising element that has 
been missing from the earlier discussions of prior restraints. At its core, the 
doctrine of prior restraints embodies, not only principles of free speech, but 
principles of separation of powers as well. Each branch of government is 
restricted in terms oftiming, both in regard to the communication itself and to the 
actions of the other branches of government. Separation of powers has always 
been a critical, if indirect, mechanism for preserving individual liberty. As 
Justice Kennedy remarked, "[I]iberty is always at stake when one or more of the 
branches seek to transgress the separation of powers.,,11 Nowhere is that more 
true than in the doctrine of prior restraints. 
The inclusion of separation of powers principles permits, for the first time, 
the creation of a complete definition of prior restraints. Once this definition has 
been given, two facts become clear. First, the doctrine of prior restraints can be 
easily and consistently applied to a wide range of speech-related issues. Second, 
it remains of critical importance for the protection of free expression that the 
prior restraint doctrine be preserved. 
reasonable relation to the common-sense meaning of the category label." [d. at 30. 
8. First Amendment expert Floyd Abrams once told a symposium that "he was very 
tempted. as an advocate, to characterize anything having the vaguest semblance to a prior restraint 
as a prior restraint, since prior restraints are somewhat of a taboo." Donald M. Gillmor, Prologue 
to Near v. Minnesota 50th Anniversary Symposium, 66 MINN. L. REv. 1.8 (1981). 
9. LAURENCEH. TRIBE,AMERICANCONSTITUTIONALLAW §§ 12-34, at 1040 (2ded. 1988). 
See also Jeffries, supra note 3, at 413 (referring to the "latent plasticities" of the prior restraint 
doctrine). 
to. Thomas I. Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 648, 
650 (1955). See also Redish, supra note 5, at 54 (stating that "apparent doctrinal ambiguities and 
inconsistencies result from the absence of any detailed judicial analysis of the true rationale behind 
the prior restraint doctrine"). 
11. Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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l. THE ENGLISH HERITAGE 
A. Licensing Printing 
The first printing in England occurred in 1476, and it was not long after that 
restrictions began to be imposed.12 Printing posed a new danger to the 
established regimes. Communication was suddenly possible with many more 
people. Also, because the words remained permanently affixed, rather than 
vanishing instantaneously, they served as a perpetual source of potential 
incitement. 
The first official censor was the English Church. 13 In March 1526, a printer, 
Thomas Berthelet, was brought before the ecclesiastical court. His work was not 
only unobjectionable, it actually provided nothing more than the text of a 
bishop's sermon given at, and in support of, a public burning of heretical books. 
Berthelet's offense was that the printing had occurred before the bishop had been 
given the opportunity to preview and approve the publication. 14 King Henry VIII 
gave governmental sanction to this requirement, with a proclamation in June 
1530, mandating that no religious book be printed until it had first been 
"examyned and approued by the ordinary of the diocese."ls 
After the King wrested control ofthe Church in the early 1530's, protection 
of the Crown became as high a priority as protection ofthe faith. In 1538, a new 
proclamation was issued, Proclamation Antiquity 2 (97), which instituted the first 
comprehensive licensing system.'6 Religious books were still to be licensed by 
bishops, but all others needed the approval of members of King Henry VIII's 
Privy Council." The penalty for unauthorized publication included loss of 
property, fine, or imprisonment. Printers could also be required to post bond of 
up to 100 pounds to guarantee their compliance with the law. IS 
In 1546, the rules were modified to speed up the book approval process. 19 
Under Proclamation Antiquity 2 (171), licensors were required to decide on the 
merits of each book within two days of receiving their copy in order to avoid the 
problem of unlimited delay.20 
The licensing law was revised again in 1559, one year into the reign of 
12. See FRED S. SIEBERT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS IN ENGLAND 1476·1776: THE RISE AND 
DECLINE OF GOVERNMENT CONTROL 22·23 (1965). The first English printer is believed to have 
been William Caxton. See id. at 22. 
13. See id. at 42. 
14. See id. at 43. 
15. Id. at 46. 
16. See id. at 48·49. 
17. See id. at 49. 
18. See id. 
19. See id. at 5 1. 
20. See id. 
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Queen Elizabeth.21 Her royal injunctions required review prior to the publication 
of all books, pamphlets, plays and ballads, and mandated that the name of the 
licensor who approved the work "be added in the end of euery such worke, for 
a testomonie of the alowance thereof.,,22 
The next major step in the regulation of printing occurred in 1586, and 
involved two of the most powerful forces ever created for limiting a free press, 
the Stationers Company and the Star Chamber.23 The Stationers Company was 
the royally-authorized organization of printers and writers. Members of the 
Stationers Company received special privileges, most notably freedom from 
competition,24 and the number of printers was strictly limited. In 1585, the 
Queen ordered thatthere should be no printing presses except in London, Oxford 
and Cambridge, with only one press allowed in each of the two universities.2s 
The Company had two primary objectives: 1) protecting the economic interest 
of its members in limiting the number of printers, and 2) defending the interests 
of their protector, the Crown. 
The Star Chamber has long symbolized the arbitrary and uncontrollable 
abuse of power both in England and the United States. The Star Chamber served 
as an unhealthy hybrid oflegislature and court, issuing regulations and trying and 
sentencing those accused of violating its laws. A colonial journalist later 
described the Star Chamber as 
a Court of which no Friend to his Country can speak without Emotion; 
and indeed it was such a cruel Engine of Oppression, that it deserves the 
sharpest Invectives. 
It was a Tribunal in which our King antiently presided in Person; 
and his Assistants were his own Privy Counsellors. Its Name is owing 
to the Ceiling of the Chamber where it was held, which was garnished 
with golden Stars; and proceeding without a Jury, well might the poor 
Subject tremble before a Bar where every Circumstance inspired Terror 
and Confusion .... 
. . . They heard Witnesses, examined even the accused, and pronounced 
Judgment both as Judges and Jurors. 26 
On June 23, 1586, the Star Chamber issued a decree which regulated every 
aspect of printing.27 All printers were required to register their presses with the 
21. See id. at 57. 
22. Id. 
23. See id. at 69. 
24. See id. at 68-71. 
25. See JAMES PATERSON, THE LIBERTY OF THE PRESS, SPEECH, AND PUBLIC WORSHIP 44 
n.4 (1880); see a/so WILLIAM PIERCE, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO THE MARPRELA TETRACTS 
23 (1908). 
26. William Smith, Letter to Printer, N. Y. GAZETTE; OR WKL Y. POST-BOY, Mar. 19, 1770, 
at number 1420. 
27. See SIEBERT, supra note 12, at 68-74. 
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Stationers Company and receive a license prior to the publication of any work. 
The number of printers was strictly limited, with the Archbishop of Canterbury 
and the Bishop of London empowered to determine how many master printers 
could be licensed.28 
The Stationers Company was authorized to search for illegal presses and 
printed material. The decree permitted the Company "to make search in all 
workhouses, shops, warehouses of printers, booksellers, bookbinders, or where 
they shall have reasonable cause of suspicion.,,29 
Violators of Company rules could face not only a fine but destruction of 
printing presses as well. The Company was permitted to order the "defacing, 
burning, breaking and destroying" of presses and type.30 A typical case involved 
Roger Ward, who published an unauthorized book of sermons. In its order, the 
judicial branch of the Company, the Court of Assistants, detailed the illegal 
practices ofthis underground printer: "[H]e did also kepe & conceal a presse and 
other printing stuff in a Taylors house neere adioyninge to his own house and did 
hyde his letters in a henhouse neere St Sepulchres churche exp'ssely agt the 
decrees of the starcha[m]ber.,,31 The Court of Assistants ordered that, "all his 
presses and printinge instruments shalbe defaced & made unserviceable for 
pri nting.'032 
The most important defiance of the Star Chamber decree involved the 
Marprelate Tracts, a set of Puritan pamphlets pub I ished between 1588 and 1589. 
This was not a peaceful period in English history. On May 9, 1588, a large fleet 
of warships, the Spanish Armada, set sail from Portugal for the English Channel, 
only to be defeated by bad weather in late August. 
A different kind of assault was launched in October 1588, when the first of 
several tracts was published under the pseudonym, Martin Marprelate.33 This 
pamphlet, popularly called, The Epistle, satirized the existing religious 
establishment, particularly the Bishops.34 Even the supposed author's name, mar-
prelate, was a none-too-subtle dig at the Church. Referring to the pamphlet, 
Winston Churchill wrote: "Their sturdy and youthful invective shows a robust 
and relishing consciousness of the possibilities of English prose.,,35 
It is still not known for certain who authored the Marprelate Tracts, but 
several players participated in the conspiracy. Robert Waldegrave was a Puritan 
printer who had previously battled the religious authorities.36 On April 16, 1588, 
28. See id. 
29. Jd. at 84 (quoting Item VI of the Star Chamber Decree of 1586). 
30. Jd. at 85 (quoting Item VII of the Star Chamber Decree of 1586). 
31. Order of July 4, 1590. W. GREGG, RECORDS OF THE COURT OF THE STATIONERS' 
COMPANY 42 (1930). 
32. Jd. 
33. See generally PIERCE, supra note 25, at 148. 
34. See id. at 148-49. 
35. WINSTON S. CHURCHILL, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH SPEAKING PEOPLES: THE NEW 
WORLD 116 (1956). 
36. See PIERCE, supra note 25, at 151. 
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the Stationers Company broke down the main walls of his house and seized his 
press and type.37 Waldegrave was able to leave the house with a box of type 
hidden "under his c1oke.,,38 He then set up a secret press at the home of Elizabeth 
Crane, the widow of Nicholas Crane, a Puritan who had died in Newgate prison 
a short time before.39 As the first copies of The Epistle left the Kingston area 
where Crane lived and began circulating throughout the country, the Privy 
Council ordered that those responsible for its publication be located and 
arrested.40 By the time Church officials began questioning residents of Kingston, 
the press had been moved to a new location in Fawsley. The journey took almost 
two weeks, as the press, hidden in a cart under straw and hay, bounced along 
unsafe country roads.41 
In Fawsley, towards the end of November 1588, the second Marprelate tract, 
The Epitome, was published.42 Each new publication, with its fresh attack on the 
Bishops of England, intensified the search for the press. As if to give new 
meaning to the phrase "movable type," the printing press was continually 
transported in secret from Fawsley to Norton to Coventry, and then on to the 
village ofWarington.43 On August 1, 1589, as the press was being unloaded in 
Warington, some type fell out of its box and spilled onto the ground.44 Since 
printing presses were illegal in most of the country, the townspeople had never 
seen type before and were unable to identify the pieces of metal. One of the 
Marprelate printers, John Hodgkins, told the crowd which had assembled that 
"they were shott," but apparently not everyone was convinced.4s Someone in the 
crowd picked up a piece of type and was finally able to have it properly 
identified.46 On August 14, the local sheriff burst into their home and arrested 
Hodgkins and two of his assistants, Valentine Simms and Arthur Thomlyn.47 
The three men were transported to London, where they were. sent to the 
Tower for questioning.48 At the Tower, the three were placed on the rack and 
subjected to excruciating torture.49 All confessed to their parts in the printing of 
the Marprelate tracts.so Before the Star Chamber, Hodgkins argued that the 
confessions should not be believed because the confessions of Simms and 
Thomlyn "had bene violent[ly] extorted from them," and his own confession 
37. See id. at 152. 
38. Jd. 
39. See id. at 154. 
40. See id. at 159-60. 
41. See id. at 178. 
42. See id. at 178-79. 
43. See id. at 178-80, 189. 
44. See id. at 189-90. 
45. Id. at 190. 
46. See id. 
47. See id. 
48. See id. at 191, 197. 
49. See id. at 198. 
50. See id. at 199. 
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"was forced thereunto by rackinge and great tonnents.,,51 Nonetheless, all three 
were kept in prison.52 
Most of the other Marprelate conspirators met similar fates. John Udall, 
whose earlier writings were the basis of some of the Marprelate publications, 
died in prison.53 John Penry, who many suspect of being one of the primary 
authors of the Marprelate tracts, escaped to Scotland but was hanged for treason 
on his return to England in 1593.54 
Licensing of the press continued to serve as the primary, though not 
exclusive, means for limiting printed opposition to both the crown and church 
throughout the early Seventeenth Century. A second Star Chamber decree, in 
1637, reiterated and expanded the licensing requirement. The difficulty of 
enforcing these requirements was bemoaned by the Star Chamber itself, which 
stated that: 
divers abuses have ... beene practised by the craft and malice of wicked 
and evill disposed persons, to the prejudice of the publike; And divers 
libellous, seditious, and mutinous bookes have beene unduly printed, and 
other bookes and papers without licence, to the disturbance ofthe peace 
ofthe Church and State.55 
The Star Chamber usually dealt only with those "wicked and evill disposed 
persons" who had published without prior approval, and the trial of a licensed 
publisher was cause for great comment.56 For example, in 1637, William Prynne, 
with a questionably obtained license, published Calvinist tracts attacking the 
practices of the Presbyterian church. His trial in the Star Chamber was on 
charges of seditious libel, that is, impermissible criticism of the government.57 
The rarity of proceeding against a licensed book is illustrated by the lawyer who 
exclaimed to the Star Chamber, "are none brought but such as are Unlicensed. ,,58 
The licensor who had granted approval for the offensive work, William 
Buckner, pleaded in his own defense that Prynne had included unexamined pages 
51. Id. 
52. See id. 
53. See id. at 214. 
54. See Wilson, The Marprelate Controversy, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF ENGLISH 
LITERATURE 383 (1964). It is noteworthy that, as was typical of the earliest proponents of liberty 
of religion and speech, these early opponents of censorship had only an imperfect appreciation of 
the concepts of these freedoms. Even the hunted printers of the Marprelate tracts would have 
denied these rights to those who followed the "Antichristian pope." PIERCE, supra note 25, at 1 94 
(quoting THE PROTESTATYON OF MARTIN MARPRELAT 3 (1589)). 
55. Star Chamber Decree of 1637, reprinted in 2 COMPLETE PROSE WORKS OF JOHN MIL TON 
793 (1959). 
56. Id. 
57. See SIEBERT, supra note 12, at 124. 
58. Philip Hamburger, The Development of the Law of Seditious Libel and the Control of 
the Press, 37 STAN. L. REv. 661, 679 (1985). 
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along with the licensed work and was fined fifty pounds for his negligence.s9 
Prynne was convicted in summary proceedings and sentenced to both a fine and' 
the loss of his ears. The mutilation occurred on a platform in the center of town. 
The large crowd that watched the proceedings was loudly sympathetic for the 
victim and visibly antagonistic toward the bishops and Star Chamber. 
The end ofthe unpopular Star Chamber, which occurred on July 5, 1641, did 
not mean the end to restraints on the press. On June 14, 1643, a new licensing 
law was enacted.60 This time, it was the Parliament that was to serve as censor, 
rather than the Crown. In its order, Parliament noted ''the great late abuses and 
frequent disorders in Printing many false forged, scandalous, seditious, libellous, 
and unl icensed Papers, Pamphlets, and Books to the great defamation of Religion 
and govemment.'t61 Parliament also complained that unlicensed printers had 
begun to "print, vend, publish and disperse Books, pamphlets and papers, in such 
multitudes, that no industry could be suficient to discover or bring to punishment, 
all the severell abounding delinquents.,,62 Under Parliament's new order, all 
books and pamphlets had to be approved by licensors appointed by either the 
House of Commons or the House of Lords. 63 
About th is time, intellectuals began to expound on the need for freedom from 
prior review as an indispensable ingredient for a free society and a free press. In 
1644, William Walwyn published an anonymous pamphlet, The Compassionate 
Samaritane, which conceded the appropriateness of penalizing those who 
attacked the State, but criticized the practice of licensing the press: 
[A]n Ordinance for licensing of Books, which being intended by the 
Parliament for a good & necessary and (namely) the prohibition of all 
Bookes dangerous or scandalous to the State, is become by meanes of 
the Licensers (who are Devines and intend their owne interest) most 
serviceable to themselves (scandalous Bookes being still dispert) in the 
stopping of honest men writings, that nothing may come to the Worlds 
view but what they please, unlesse men whill runne the hazard of 
imprisonment, (as I now doe) so that in publike they may speake what 
they will, write what they will, they may abuse whom they will, and 
nothing can besaid agains them.64 
A few months later, on November 24, 1644, John Milton published 
Areopagitica.6s This work has been regarded as one ofthe first great statements 
59. See SIEBERT, supra note 12, at 145. 
60. See id. at 186-87. 
61. Licensing Order of June 14, 1643, reprinted in 2 COMPLETE PROSE WORKS OF JOHN 
MILTON, supra note 55, at 797. 
62. Id. 
63. See id. 
64. WILLIAM WALWYN, THE COMPASSIONATE SAMARITANE 37-40 (1644), quoted in 
SIEBERT, supra note 12, at 194. 
65. AREOPAGITICA; A SPEECH OF MR. JOHN MILTON FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENC'D 
PRINTING, TO THE PARLAMENT OF ENGLAND, reprinted in 2 COMPLETE PROSE WORKS OF JOHN 
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for freedom of expression, though, like the author of the Marprelate tracts, 
Milton was unwilling to extend his tolerance to "Popery, and open 
superstition.,,66 
Milton was also willing to concede that the Government should be able to 
penalize offensive speech. If printers published scandalous or seditious work, 
Milton accepted the premise that the Government should "confine, imprison, and 
do sharpest justice on them as malefactors.,,67 But, licensing, according to 
Milton, created a special and intolerable harm by preventing books from ever 
seeing the light of day. Prior to the imposition of licensing: 
Books were ever as freely adm itted into the World as any other birth; the 
issue of the brain was no more stitl'd then the issue of the womb ... if 
it prov'd a Monster, who denies, but that it was justly burnt, or sunk into 
the Sea. But that a Book in wors condition then a peccant soul, should 
be to stand before a Jury ere it be borne to the World, and undergo yet 
in darknesse the judgement of Radamanth and his Collegues [the 
mythical judges of Hades], ere it can passe the ferry backward into light, 
was never heard before .... 68 
Another aspect of licensing that haunted Milton was his view that prior 
suppression of a work robbed humanity of its ideas for all time. Milton said, 
"who kills a Man kills a reasonable creature, Gods Image; but hee who destroyes 
a good Booke, kills reason it selfe, kills the Image of God, as it were in the eye[,] 
... slaies an immortality rather then a life.,,69 
In spite of the pleas of poets, licensing continued for most of the Seventeenth 
Century. New laws were passed in 1647 and 1662. The Licensing Act of 1662 
both prohibited the publication of seditious and heretical works, and prohibited 
the publication of books without license by the Stationers' Company.70 In 1679, 
the licensing statute expired, but Englishjudges ruled that the Crown could still 
license even without statutory authority. In a 1680 trial for the crime of 
publishing a weekly newspaper without a license, the recorder for the court, 
George Jeffreys, stated that, "[i]t is the opinion of all the judges of England that 
MIL TON, supra note 55, at 485-570 [hereinafter AREOPAGITICA]. 
66. [d. at 565. See generally LEONARD LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 93-97 (1985). 
Despite its limitations, Areopagilica provides solid arguments for freedom of expression. Milton 
proclaimed his beliefthat open discussion, free from governmental control, would produce ''Truth.'' 
AREOPAGITICA, supra note 65, at 561. In perhaps the most quoted passage, Milton argued: 
[d. 
And though all the windes of doctrin were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth be 
in the field, we do injuriously by licencing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. 
Let her and Falshood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the wors, in a free and open 
encounter. 
67. Id. at 492. 
68. /d. at 505-06 (citations omitted). 
69. Id. at 492-93. 
70. See PATERSON, supra note 25, at 45-46 n.l. 
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it is the law of the land, that no person should offer to expose to public 
knowledge any thing that concerns the government, without the king' s immediate 
license."') 
Parliament, however, was not content to rely on such judicial reasoning, and 
passed licensing acts in 1685 and again in 1692. The 1692 Act expired by its 
own terms in 1695. Although the House of Lords voted to renew the law, the 
House of Commons refused. The reasons given for permitting the licensing law 
to lapse were far more practical than philosophical.72 The two main complaints 
about the licensing system were that it was ineffective in stopping scurrilous 
books and that poorly paid licensors were frequently bribed by aspiring 
publishers. 
Many printers protested the special privileges and protections oflaw granted 
to the favored few. The House of Commons also complained that, while the 
Licensing Act banned "offensive" works, it supplied no test for offensiveness. 
Moreover, because the Act did not specify the penalty for violations, judges were 
free to impose arbitrary and excessive penalties. The House of Commons did 
not, however, argue that the press should be free to criticize the Government, or 
even that licensing itself was destructive of freedom. In the words of British 
historian Lord T.B. Macaulay, "[o]n the great question of principle, on the 
question whether liberty of unlicensed printing be, on the whole, a blessing or a 
curse to society, not a word is said.'073 
Despite the uninspired reasoning of Parliament, the expiration of the 
Licensing Act quickly became perceived as a monumental victory for freedom 
of the press. In 1701, Daniel Defoe described the "tyranny of a Licenser" as one 
of the great burdens ever to have been imposed on the press, and credited the 
English Government with the wisdom to end this evil: 
This, in all Ages, has been a method so ill, so arbitrary and so subjected 
to bribery and Parties, that the Government has thought fit, in justice to 
71. The Trial of Henry Carr. or Care. at the Guildhall of London. Fora Libel: 32 Charles 
II. A.V. 1680, in 7 COBBETT'S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR 
HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE 
PRESENT TIME 1111, ·1115 (1810). Lord Chief Justice William Scroggs concurred in this statement 
of the common law of England: 
[T]o print or publish any newsbooks or pamphlets of news whatsoever, is illegal; that 
it is a manifest intent to the breach of the peace, and they may be proceeded against by 
law for an illegal thing. Suppose now that this thing is not scandalous, what then? If 
there had been no reflection in this book at all, yet it is illicite, and the author ought to 
be convicted for it. And that is for a public notice to all people, and especially printers 
and booksellers, that they ought to print no book or pamphlet of news whatsoever, 
without authority. 
Id. at 1127 (second emphasis added). This case led to the impeachment of Justice Scroggs. See 
infra notes 92-96 and accompanying text. 
72. See H.L. JOUR., XV, 545-46 (April 18, 1695); see also 11 H.C. JOUR. 306 (1695). 
73. T.B. MACAULAY, III HISTORY OF ENGLAND 328 (1906). 
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the Learned Part of the World, not to suffer it; since it has always been 
shutting up the Press to one side, and opening it to the other; which, as 
Affairs are in England often changing, has, in its tum, been oppressive 
to both.74 
B. The Distrust of Judges 
A second development in the battle for a free press involved the growing 
consensus in England that judges were a potential source of oppression. Thus, 
one ofthe major Eighteenth Century battles for freedom ofthe press in England 
was to give jurors, rather than judges, the power to detennine whether 
publications were in fact defamatory. Previously, jurors had been limited to the 
question of whether the defendant published the material.7s 
The most notorious case of penalizing independent-minded jurors involved 
the 1670 English trial of William Penn, later the founder and first Governor of 
Pennsylvania. Penn had been charged with violating the Conventicle Act, which 
prohibited the exercise of religion "in other manner than according to the liturgy 
of the Church of England.,,76 Penn, a Quaker, had been preaching on a London 
street comer, and there was no denying that such preaching had occurred.77 
During Penn's trial, the court told the jury to ignore the defendant's plea for 
acquittal based on freedom of conscience. The court recorder instructed the jury 
that witnesses had testified to the fact of the preaching and that they were "to 
keep and to observe, as what hath been fully sworn, at your peri/.,,78 From the 
bale-dock, a prison-like cylindrical structure in the comer of the courtroom where 
he had been placed, Penn cried out, "I appeal to the jury, who are my judges, and 
this great assembly, whether the proceedings ofthe court are not most arbitrary, 
and void of all law, in offering to give the jury their charge in the absence of the 
prisoners. ,,79 
The jury refused to hand down a guilty verdict.80 Led by jurymember, 
Edward Bushel, the jury found Penn guilty of "preaching," but pointedly omitted 
any reference to guilt of unlawful preaching.BI' The Recorder responded to the 
jury: 
Gentlemen, ... you shall not be dismissed, till we have a verdict that the 
74. DANIEL DEFOE, THE TRUE BORN ENGLISHMAN (1703). reprinted in LATER STUART 
TRACTS 110 (1964). 
75. This controversy was finally resolved by statute in 1792, when Fox'sAct, 1792,32 Geo. 
3 c. 60, declared that juries may give a general verdict of guilty or not guilty on libel. 
76. CATHERINE OWENS PEARE, WILLIAM PENN, A BIOGRAPHY 106-07 (1956) (quoting the 
Conventicle Act). 
77. See id. at 109-10. 
78. /d. at 118. 
79. Id. 
80. See id. at 119-22. 
81. Id. at 120. 
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court will accept; and you shall be locked up, without meat, drink, fire 
and tobacco. You shall not think thus to abuse the court. 'We will have 
a verdict by the help of God, or you shall starve for it. 82 
307 
The next day, the jury announced the verdict that "William Penn is gUilty of 
speaking in Gracious Street," again refusing to term it unlawful.83 After more 
threats by the court, William Penn said, "[i]t is intolerable that my jury should 
be thus menanced .... What hope is there of ever having justice done, when 
juries are threatened, and their verdicts rejected?,,84 The next morning, the jury 
announced that Penn was "not guilty."S5 Upon hearing the verdict, the Recorder 
stated, "'I am sorry, gentlemen, you have followed your own judgment and 
opinions rather than the good and wholesome advice which was given you. ",86 
All twelve members of the jury were fined and sent to Newgate prison until 
they paid.8? Eight paid rather quickly, but four, Edward Bushel, John Hammond, 
Charles Milson and John Baily, refused and stayed in prison for several months. 
Finally, the Court of Common Pleas ruled that jurors could not be penalized for 
such conduct: "It is absurd, a jury should be fined by the judge for going against 
their evidence .... "88 
More than a century later, American colonists would recite this case as an 
example ofthe need for juries to protect liberty against the overreaching of the 
Crown's judges. One colonial writer referred to the much respected William 
Penn as "the same to whom we owe one of the freest and fairest of our 
Colonies,"89 and analogized his case to colonial trials for seditious libels, where 
juries were denied the right to determine the validity of printed complaints 
against the government. The obvious lesson for colonial libertarians was that 
juries were forever to be viewed as a "Bulwark ofSaftey against Pride, Insolence 
and Partiality of Power.,,90 
In 1680, ten years after the trial of William Penn, Lord Chief Justice William 
Scroggs was impeached for his abuse of judicial authority.91 Under Scroggs' 
rulings, the House of Commons declared, "all the mischiefs and excesses of the 
82. Id. 
83. Id. at 121. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 122. 
86. SYDNEY GEORGE FISHER, THE TRUE WILLIAM PENN 145 () 899). 
87. See PEARE, supra note 76, at 123. 
88. Jd. at 124. 
89. Smith, supra note 26, at 1420. 
90. Jd. For a more modem judicial tribute to William Penn's jurors, see Commonwealth v. 
Contakos, 453 A,2d 578, 580·82 (Pa. 1982). 
91. See generally Proceedings Against Lord Chief Justice Scroggs Before the Privy Council; 
and Against the Said Lord Chief Justice and Other Judges in Parliament: 32 Charles II. A.D. 1680, 
in 8 COBBETf'S COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON 
AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE PRESENT TIME, supra 
note 71, at 63 [hereinafter Proceedings Against Lord Chief Justice Scroggs]. 
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court of Star-Chamber, by act of parliament suppressed, have been again, in 
direct opposition of the said law, introduced.,,92 
The House of Commons highlighted the case of Henry Carr, which Chief 
Justice Scroggs had presided over earlier that same year.93 Carr published a 
periodical entitled, The Weekly Pacquet of Advicefrom Rome, or, the History of 
Popery.94 According to one of the Articles ofImpeachment voted by the House 
of Commons, Chief Justice Scroggs, "before any legal conviction of the said Carr 
of any crime, did ... in a most illegal and arbitrary manner, make, and cause to 
be entered, a certain rule of that court against the printing of the said 
[periodical].,,95 In one of the first official pronouncements against what was to 
later become termed "prior restraints," the House of Commons voted that the 
Chief Justice's ruling was "most apparently contrary to alljustice, in condemning 
not only what had been written without hearing the parties, but also all that might 
for the future be written on that subject. ,,96 
The principle behind favoring jurors, in these cases, over judges was 
explained by Lord Camden: 
Who shall have the care of the liberty of the press-the judges or the 
people of England? The jury are the people of England. The judges are 
independent men! Be it so. But are they totally beyond the possibility 
of corruption from the Crown? Is it impossible to show them favour in 
any way whatever? The truth is, they possibly may be corrupted-juries 
never can! What would be the effect of givingjudges the whole control 
of the press? Nothing would appear that could be disagreeable to the 
Government. 97 
C. Refusal to Enjoin Defamatory Statements 
The third strand in the development of the doctrine of prior restraints is 
found in the well-known maxim that "equity will not enjoin a libel." The history 
of defamation law reveals that in England, at the time the First Amendment was 
92. Id. at 199. 
93. See id. at 198-99. 
94. Id. at 198. This publication was opposed to the "superstitions and cheats of the church 
of Rome," and the House of Commons took Chief Justice Scroggs's suppression of it to be proof 
of the Chief Justice's "manifest countenancing of popery." Id. 
95. Id. The Articles of Impeachment refer to the weekly publication as a "book," but it 
would more properly be regarded as a "periodical" today. See. e.g., JOHN TOWNSHEND, A TREATISE 
ON THE WRONGS CALLED SLANDER AND LIBEL AND ON THE REMEDY BY CIVIL ACTION FOR THOSE 
WRONGS 688 (4th ed. 1890). 
96. Proceedings Against Lord Chief Justice Scroggs, supra note 91, at 198 (emphasis 
added). The judicial order banning future publication was also seen as a violation of principles of 
separation of powers. The House of Commons also voted that the order constituted "an 
encroachment and assuming to [the Court) a legislative power and authority." Id. at 199. 
97. PATERSON, supra note 25, at 221 n.6. 
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ratified, libel was an offense that could only be punished, but could not be 
prevented. 
There were several different roots to the English law of defamation. During 
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries, defamatory statements were generally 
considered to be matters for religious tribunals, and the ecclesiastical courts 
heard many cases involving imputations of crimes and sexual immorality.98 The 
penalties for defamation included a public request for forgiveness and 
excommunication.99 
By the end of the Fifteenth Century, complaints against defamation were 
heard in two different courts, the Star Chamber and the common-law courts. 
Early in the 1600s, the Star Chamber declared that libel was a criminal offense 
because it tended to cause breaches of the peace, and if the libel was "against a 
magistrate, or other public person, it is a greater offence."loo Sir Edward Coke, 
who authored the opinion, added that anonymous libels, which of course meant 
that they were unlicensed, were particularly egregious and "ought to be severely 
punished."101 The Star Chamber's penalties for those found guilty of libel were 
harsh: 
[A] libeller shall be punished either by indictment at the common law, 
or by bill, if he deny it, or ore tenus on his confession in the Star 
Chamber, and according to the quality ofthe offence he may be punished 
by fme or imprisonment, and if the case be exorbitant, by pillory and loss 
of his ears .... 102 
Moreover, there was no possible protection from ajury of one's peers. The Star 
Chamber ruled alone on both questions of law and fact. 103 
About this same time, the common-law courts were wresting jurisdiction 
away from the ecclesiastical courts and c1aimingjurisdiction over defamations 
which caused "temporal damages. ,,104 Thus private persons who wanted to obtain 
98. The local courts also heard complaints about insulting statements through the 14th 
century. See. e.g., R.C. Donnelly, History of Defamation, 1949 WIS. L. REv. 99, 100-OJ. 
99. See generally SELECT CASES ON DEFAMATION TO 1600, at xiv-xx (R.H. Helmholz ed., 
1985). 
100. Van Vechten Veeder, The History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 COLUM. L. 
REv. 546,565 (1903) (quoting De Libellis Famois, 5 Co. Rep. 125 (1606». This ruling actually 
represented an expansion of the Star Chamber's jurisdiction to prosecute those who violated the 
statutes involving scandalum-magnatum. This literally means "scandal of magnates," but generally 
included attacks against the King or others high in the government. Dueling was a major concern 
of the Star Chamber, and the belief was that punishing defamation was one way to prevent private 
demands for retribution. See id. 
101. Id. 
102. Id. 
103. See. e.g., 2 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 
308-09 (1883). 
104. William L. Prosser, Libel Per Quod, 46 VA. L. REv. 839,841 (1960). At first, the 
common law courts merely claimed jurisdiction over any defamatory statement that "touches or 
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damages for a defamatory statement quickly turned to the common-law courts. 
Because the Star Chamber heard claims of criminal libel and printed defamation, 
the common-law courts were left mostly with spoken private defamation. 
When the Star Chamber was abolished in 1641, the common-law courts 
assumed its former jurisdiction over defamation, though the rules governing the 
different forms of defamation were never well-integrated. In 1670, the court 
formalized the division between libel, or written defamation, and slander, which 
is spoken. \05 
As licensing of the press continued through 1694, the doctrine of common-
law defamation developed relatively slowly. After all, most printed defamatory 
statements never saw the light of day. In the 1700s, absent the power to license, 
the English Government often attacked its critics with criminal actions for 
seditious libels. These were heard in the common-law courts, which also claimed 
exclusive power to hear private libels. 
The courts of equity, accordingly, were denied authority to hear claims for 
defamation. As early as 1742. it was ruled in the St. James's Evening Post Case, 
that the courts of equity had no jurisdiction over claims of libel and slander: 
"For whether it is a libel against the pub lick or private persons, the only method 
is to proceed at law. ,,106 Since the common-law courts then had no power at all 
to grant injunctions, the resultant ruling meant that, in England, defamation could 
not be enjoined; the only permissible remedy was money damages at law. 
Eventually, the inability of equity courts to enjoin libel became considered 
an integral part of a free press. While a few cases implied that equity could, in 
fact, enjoin a libellous publication,107 these cases were quickly dismissed as 
aberrational throwbacks to a discredited era. For example, it was reported that 
the very contention that injunctions could in fact be granted to prevent libel 
"excited great astonishment in the minds of all the practitioners ofthe courts of 
equity ."108 According to the court reporter in Horne's Case, this surprise was due 
to the fact that 
there is not to be found in the books any decision or any dictum, 
posterior to the days of the Star Chamber, from which such doctrine can 
be deduced, either directly, or by inference or analogy: unless indeed we 
are to except the proceedings of ... Scroggs and his associates, in the 
concerns anything detenninable at the common law." Palmer v. Thorpe, K.B., Trin. Tenn. 25 Eliz. 
[1583], Coke's Rep .• Vol. 2, p. 315, part 4. p. 20. This meant imputations of crimes, for example, 
were heard in common-law rather than ecclesiastical courts. 
105. See The King v. Lake. Hardes 470 (1670), cited in Veeder, supra note toO, at 569-70. 
106. Roach v. Garvan, 26 Eng. Rep. 683, 683 (1742). This case was popularly known as the 
St. James's Evening Post Case. This case was hardly a complete victory for freedom of the press. 
The court held that equity had jurisdictions over contempt of court, and the printers were 
"committed to the Fleet." ld. at 685. 
107. See DuBost v. Beresford. 2 Camp. 511-12 (1810) (ChiefLord Ellenborough); Burnett 
v. Chetwood, 2 Mer. 441 (1720) (Lord Macclesfield). 
108. Home's Case. 20 Howell's State Trials 651, 799 (1777). 
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case of Henry Care. 109 
The 1848 case of Clark v. Freeman announced a similar linkage of the 
concept of enjoining libels to the censorial practices of the past.))O In rejecting 
a plea to enjoin the publication of defamatory statements that alleged that a 
physician to the Queen, "is somehow concerned in vending quack medicines," 
the court stated, "I am afraid that ifl were to interfere as is now asked, I should 
be reviving the criminal jurisdiction of the Star Chamber."))) 
Thus, an extraordinarily important rule was created more as an offshoot of 
a jurisdictional dispute than as a calculated understanding of the needs of a free 
press. In fact, the creation ofthe rule that equity will not enjoin a libel parallels 
the almost anti-climatic ending of licensing of the press. These were both 
"historical accidents,,112 that became understood as invaluable steps along the 
road to liberty of the press. 
D. Understanding England's Liberty of the Press 
By the time the United States ratified the First Amendment, a consensus had 
developed in England that liberty of the press required the ability to put forth to 
the world what one wanted, as long as the printer was willing to accept the 
consequences of punishment for material considered illegal. No administrative 
licensor or censor could preview work prior to publication, and no judicial orders 
could prevent what could be written for the future. 
This background provides context for Sir William Blackstone's famous 
description ofliberty of the press. In his Commentaries on the Laws of England, 
Blackstone described why punishment for libels was consistent with liberty of 
the press: 
The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state: 
but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications, and 
not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published. Every 
freeman has an undoubted right to lay what sentiments he pleases before 
the public: to forbid this is to destroy the freedom ofthe press: but if he 
publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal, he must take the 
109. Jd. In 1861, Lord Cambell discussed the cases of Burnett v, Chetwood, 2 Mer. 441 
(1720), and DuBost v. Beresford,2 Camp. 511 (1810), and declared, "I have no hesitation in saying 
that Lord Macclesfield was wrong .... [and] that Lord Ellenborough was wrong." Emperor of 
Austria v. Day & Kossuth, 3 De. a.F. & F. 217, 239'(1 86\), 
110. 11 Beav. 112 (1848) (Lord Langdale, Master of Rolls). 
111. Jd. at 117-18. For other early cases holding that equity lacked jurisdiction to enjoin 
libels, see Prudential Assurance Co. v. Knott, 10 Law Rep. 142 (1875); Seeley v. Fisher, 11 Sim. 
581 (1841); Martin v. Wright, 6 Sim, 297 (1833); Gee v. Pritchard, 2 Swanston 428 (1818), See 
generally W. BLAKE ODGERS, THE LAW OF LIBEL AND SLANDER 334-37 (2d ed. 1887). 
112. See, e.g., Veeder, supra note 100, at 571 ("The process of attempting to give a rational 
or scientific basis to legal rules which have their origin in historical accidents is familiar to students 
of English law; the law of defamation has been its favorite field."). 
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consequences of his own temerity.1J3 
Although this statement indicates the general English opposition to "previous 
restraints," it does not actually say what constitutes such a restraint. 114 
Blackstone merely contrasts previous restraints with punishments that are 
imposed after someone "publishes what is improper, mischievous, or illegal.,,11S 
Later in this same section, Blackstone discusses the licensing of the previous 
century, but again does not purport to catalog the full array of impermissible 
previous restraints, but simply contrasts such a restraint with a subsequent 
punishment. 116 
Thus, Blackstone did not discuss, one way or another, the extent to which 
judicial orders could be viewed as previous restraints.'17 Significantly, 
Blackstone's description of the remedy for a libel omits any reference to 
preventive relief: "The punishment of such libellers, for either making, 
repeating, printing, or publishing the libel, is fine, and such corporal punishment 
as the court in its discretion shall inflict; regarding the quantity of the offence, 
and the quality of the offender.,,118 
The lesson from Blackstone is simply that previous restraints, such as 
licensing, violate liberty of the press. We must turn elsewhere for a fuller 
description of what was encompassed by the term "previous restraint." 
Ten years after Blackstone's Commentaries appeared, another author gave 
an improved description. In 1775, on the dawn of the American Revolution, Jean 
DeLolme wrote his work, The Constitution of England. 119 DeLolme was a Swiss 
author whose description of the English government, while largely unknown to 
20th Century Americans, was well-known and well-respected by Americans at 
the start ofthe Republic. John Adams referred to DeLolme's books as "the best 
defence of the political balance of three powers that ever was written.,,120 At the 
beginning of the Revolution, many American pamphleteers cited Montesquieu 
113. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ·151-52 (1979). 
114. Seeid. 
liS. Id. at 152. 
116. See id. at ·152-53. Blackstone also wrote: 
To subject the press to the restrictive power of a licensor, as was formerly done, both 
before and since the revolution, is to subject all freedom of sentiment to the prejudices 
of one man, and make him the arbitrary and infallible judge of all controverted points 
in learning, religion, and government. But to punish (as the law does at present) any 
dangerous or offensive writings. which, when published, shall on a fair and impartial 
trial be adjudged ofa pernicious tendency, is necessary for the preservation of peace and 
good order .... 
Id. at • 152 (emphasis added). 
117. See id. at ·151-53. 
118. Id. at ·151. 
119. JEAN DELoLME, THE CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND 254 (John MacGregor ed. 1853) 
(1775). 
120. GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREA TlON OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC '575 (1969). 
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and later DeLolme on the "character of British liberty and on the institutional 
requirements for its attainment.,,121 DeLolme's book was also cited by America's 
Blackstone, St. George Tucker;122 Justice Joseph Story, the first great writer on 
the American Constitution; 123 and, eventually the V.S. Supreme Court. 124 
DeLolme's description of liberty ofthe press in England stressed that such 
liberty meant freedom from all previous restraint, whether from the judicial 
branch or from licensors: "Liberty of the press consists in this: that neither 
courts of justice, nor any judges whatever, are authorized to take notice of 
writings intended for the press; but are confined to those which are actually 
printed. ,,125 
Thus, at the time of the drafting of the First Amendment, the English 
understanding of a free press meant, at a minimum, that neither judges nor 
adm inistrators were to take notice of writings intended for the press. Battles over 
the permissibility of subsequent punishments persisted over the next two hundred 
years. But even in a repressive environment that permitted punishment for 
truthful criticism of the Government,126 one element of liberty of the press was 
well-understood: no governmental official-not licensor, not censor, not 
judge-should be involved in restricting expression before it is communicated. 
II. THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 
There is an unfortunate tendency among many who study freedom of 
expression in America to assume that all relevant jurisprudence begins with 
World War I and that the doctrine of prior restraints emerges out of thin air after 
two centuries of dormancy with the 1931 case of Near v. Minnesota ex rei. 
Olson.127 The reality is that by the time the V.S. Supreme Court struck down 
Minnesota's "Gag Law," there was a wealth of legal tradition and judicial 
decisions supporting a constitutional ban on prior restraints. 
There is no doubt that the Supreme Court itself was a fallow source of 
121. BERNARD BAIL YN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 27 
(I 967}. English Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli later described DeLolme as "England's 
Montesquieu." See JOYCE MALCOLM, To KEEP AND BEAR ARMs 166 (1 994). 
122. See ST. GEORGE TUCKER, BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 1 app. at 298-99 (1803). 
123. See 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 
1878-79, at 735-37 (1833). 
124. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 714 n.4 (1931). 
125. DELolME, supra note 119. 
126. Blackstone wrote approvingly of jailing writers for criticizing the government or its 
magistrates, even if their charge be true, "since the provocation, and not the falsity, is the thing to 
be punished criminally." See BLACKSTONE, supra note 113, at ·150. 
127. 283 U.S. 697 (1931). See, e.g., DAVID M. RABBAN, FREE SPEECH IN ITS FORGOTTEN 
YEARS 129 (1997) (stating that "no m~jor casebook on constitutional law includes a single decision 
before 1917 in its section on freedom of expression"); see also Alexis J. Anderson, The Formative 
Period of First Amendment Theory, /870-/9/5,24 AM. 1. LEGAL HIST. 56 (1980). 
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protection for First Amendment freedoms until 1931.128 For example, in 1897, 
the Court noted that a city could bar public speaking in a public park, just as "the 
owner of a private house [could] forbid it in his house.,,129 Similarly, the U.S. 
Post Office's claim to censorial power over the mails was upheld as simply the 
right of Congress ''to refuse its facilities for the distribution of matter deemed 
injurious to the public morals.,,130 
With the Federal constitutional guarantee of freedom of expression viewed 
as a hollow promise, speakers turned to the state courts for protection of free 
speech rights guaranteed by state constitutions. Although many state decisions 
were unfavorable to speakers, one topic represented a notable exception: many 
state courts struck down governmental action that was perceived to be a "prior 
restraint.,,131 
Such solicitude should not be surprising, considering the history of free 
expression which preceded the American Revolution. From the very beginning 
of the legal debate over the true meaning of America's freedom of expression, 
there has been a powerful consensus that the starting point for such freedom is 
a ban on prior restraints. Liberty of the press, as the Massachusetts Supreme 
Judicial Court declared in 1825, "was intended to prevent all such previous 
restraints upon publications as had been practised by other governments, and in 
early times here, to stifle the efforts of patriots towards enlightening their fellow 
subjects upon their rights and the duties of rulers.,,132 
A. The Road to the First Amendment 
In the American colonies, the concept offreedom of the press began slowly, 
but eventually evolved into a treasured ideal worth fighting for. The colonial 
experience taught that assaults on liberty ofthe press could come from any of the 
three branches of government: the legislative, executive, or judicial. 
During the Seventeenth Century, colonial governments followed the English 
example and used licensing laws to restrict printed material. In 1668, a pamphlet 
written by Thomas a Kempis was approved by the official censor but then banned 
by the Massachusetts Bay Colony Governor because Kempis was a "popish 
128. See. e.g., RABBAN, supra note 127, at 131 (stating that between the Civil War and World 
War I, "[n]o court was more unsympathetic to freedom of expression than the Supreme Court, 
which rarely produced even a dissenting opinion in a First Amendment case"). 
129. Davisv. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 47(1897). 
130. Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727,736 (1877). The Court was also insensitive to the free 
speech issues inherent in its contempt cases. See. e.g., Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States, 247 
U.S. 402 (1918), overruled in part by Nye v. United States, 3 \3 U.S. 33 (1941); Patterson v. 
Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907). 
131. See generally David M. Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten Years, 90 YALE 
LJ. 514,543 (1981) (noting that although many ofthe state decisions were counter to free speech, 
some provide significantly more protection than any decision made by the U.S. Supreme Court). 
132. Commonwealth v. Blanding, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 304,313-14 (I 825)(emphasis added). 
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minister.,,133 In Virginia, John Bucknew was imprisoned for printing without 
authority in 1682.134 
The first newspaper in the colonies was published in Boston on September 
25, 1690 and was entitled Pub lick Occurrences Both Forreign and Domestick. m 
Although the publisher, Benjamin Harris, had stated that the paper was to be 
"furnished once a month (or if any Glut of Occurrences happen, oftener)," the 
paper lasted only one issue. 136 Harris had criticized the Maqua tribe, allies ofthe 
English in the French and Indian Wars, because they "brought home several 
Prisoners, whom they used in a manner too barbarous for any English to 
approve."J37 The Massachusetts Governor and legislature were angered both by 
the hint of journalistic disapproval and by the fact that the publication was issued 
without license. J38 Four days later, noting that the paper contained "reflections 
of a very high nature," the Legislature voted to forbid, "any thing in print, 
without license first obtained from those appointed by the government to grant 
the same.,,139 Harris published no further issues of the newspapers and 
apparently learned to get along with those in power, as he was appointed "Printer 
to His Excellency the Governor and Council" in 1692.140 
After the demise of Publick Occurrences, the colonies waited more than 
thirty years for a truly independent newspaper. 141 On August 7, 1721, The New-
England Courant began in Boston, 142 and it did not take long for the established 
powers of church and state to be offended. In the first issue, the Courant 
attacked the giant of colonial religion, Cotton Mather. 143 Unfortunately for those 
who prefer to think of the press as the source of enlightenment, the Courant 
chose the wrong side in the debate over how to deal with the raging smallpox 
epidemic. l44 The paper condemned Mather for his endorsement of "the doubtful 
and dangerous Practice of inoculating the Small-Pox.,,14s 
Most of the other crusades carried on by the Courant were not so 
problematic. Religious hypocrisy and governmental incompetence were frequent 
targets. The acute sensitivity of those in power to any form of criticism can be 
133. WALTER BRASCH & DANA ULLOTH, THE PRESS AND THE STATE 50 (1986). 
134. See id. 
135. See FRANK LUlHERMOTT, AMERICAN JOURNALISM, A HISTORY: 1690-1960, at 9- to (3d 
ed.1962). 
136. Id. The entire issue of Publick Occurrence is reprinted in FREDERIC HUDSON, 
JOURNALISM IN THE UNITED STATES FROM 1690-1872, at 44-48 (Scholarly Press 1968) (1873). 
137. HUDSON, supra note 136, at 46. 
138. See MOTT. supra note 135. at 9. 
139. HUDSON. supra note 136, at 48. 
140. See id. at 49. 
141. See generally ARTHUR BERNON TOURTELLOT, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN: THE SHAPING OF 
GENIUS 232 (1977). 
142. See id. 
143. See id. at 234. 
144. The s!Dallpox epidemic amicted 6000 of Boston 's population of 1 0,500. See id. at 240. 
145. NEW ENG. COURANT, No.3, Aug. 14-21, 1721. 
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seen in the reaction to the paper's story on the problem of pi rate ships. Aftertwo 
pirate vessels were spotted off the Atlantic coast, the Courant reported, "[ w Je are 
advis'd from Boston, that the Government of the Massachusetts are fitting out a 
Ship to go after the Pirates, to be commanded by Capt. Peter Papillion, and 'tis 
thought he will sail sometime this Month, if Wind and Weather permit.,,146 A 
modem reader might search these words long and hard for the language which 
constituted, in the findings of the Governor's Council, "a high affront to this 
Government.,,147 Apparently, the paper was implying that the Government was 
not acting quickly enough in fighting the pirates. 
On June 12, 1721, the day after the issue of the paper containing this dubious 
criticism had been distributed, the Massachusetts' House of Representatives 
voted to place the printer of the Courant, James Franklin, injail for the duration 
of the legislative session. 148 This sentence was imposed without benefit of grand 
jury indictment or trial; it was simply a unilateral act of the legislature. The 
printer was placed in a dungeon at the Queen Street jail and after becoming ill, 
was allowed to go to the prison yard. On July 2, shortly before the end of the 
prison term, a letter was published in the Courant declaring defiantly, "we can 
easily soar above the little Vulgar, and look down on those who reproach us, with 
Pity and Courage.,,149 
When the paper continued its criticism of those in power, the House of 
Representatives responded with paradigmatic prior restraint. A special 
committee was created on January 14, 1723, to recommend the appropriate way 
to deal with the paper. One of the Committee members was the Chief Justice of 
the Province, Judge Samuel Sewall, who had helped pursue witches one-quarter 
of a century earlier in Salem. The Committee took all of one day considering the 
problem of the Courant, reporting its findings on January 15: 
The Committee appointed to Consider the Paper Called the New 
England Courant 'published Monday the 14t Currt: are humbly of 
opinion, That the Tendancy of the Said paper is to Mock Religion, & 
bring it into Contempt, That the Holy Scriptures are therein prophanely 
abused, that the Revrd and faithful Ministers of the Gospell are 
Injuriously Reflected upon, his Magesties Government affronted, and the 
peace & Good Order of his Majesties Subjects of this Province disturbed 
by the Said Courant, and for prevention ofthe like offense for the future, 
-The Committee Humbly propose that James Franklyn the Printer & 
Publisher thereof be Strictly forbidden, by this Court [the House of 
Representatives], to print, or publish the New England Courant, or any 
Pamphlet or paper of like Nature, Except it be first Supervised, by the 
Secretary of this Province . ... ISO 
146. NEW ENG. COURANT, No. 45, June 4-1 1,1722. 
147. Journals of the House of Representatives of Massachusetts, IV, 23 (1722). 
148. See id. 
149. NEW ENG. COURANT, No. 48, June 25-July 2, 1722. 
150. General Court Records, XI, 493 (emphasis added). 
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The next day, January 15, 1723, the House approved the Committee's 
recommendation. James Franklin was thus prohibited from printing not only the 
Courant but any other publication, without it first being reviewed and approved 
by the government. Again, no court proceedings were necessary for this 
sanction. 
The next few issues ofthe Courant were published with its printer in hiding. 
The first such issue used the Bible, quoting Psalm 58, in an unsubtle attack on 
Judge Sewall: 
Have ye forgot or never knew 
That God will judge the Judges, too? 
High in the Heavens his Justice Reigns; 
Yet you invade the Rights of God, 
And send your bold Decrees abroad 
To bind the Conscience in your Chains. 151 
Two weeks later, the Courant published the following anonymous open letter 
to Judge Sewall, pleading for the use of jury proceedings, rather than summary 
governmental action: 
The end of Humane Law is to fix the boundaries within which Men 
ought to keep themselves; But if any are so hardy and presumptuous as 
to break through them, doubtless they deserve punishment. Now if this 
Printer had transgress'd any Law, he ought to have been presented by a 
Grand Jury, and a fair tryal brought on. IS2 
Finally, the pressure of living in hiding, as well the risk of another prison 
term, convinced James Franklin to try a new approach. Because the restrictive 
order only applied to him personally, a decision was made to continue printing 
the Courant but with a new publisher. The position was filled by an apprentice 
at the paper, James's seventeen-year-old brother. On February 11, 1723, the 
Courant appeared with its new imprint: "Boston, Printed and Sold by Benjamin 
Franklin. at his Printing-House in Queen Street, where Advertisements and 
Letters are taken in .... "IS3 
Other co Ion ists real ized the danger posed by the requ irement of prior review 
of newspapers. Pennsylvania's only newspaper, the American Weekly Mercury, 
ended an attack on the treatment of James Franklin with the following fictitious 
caustic item: "By private Letters from Boston we are informed, that Bakers there 
are under great Apprehension of being forbid baking any more Bread, unless they 
will submit to the Secretary as Supervisor General and Weigher of the Dough, 
before it is baked into Bread, and offered to Sale."u4 
The Massachusetts' legislature was not the only colonial legislature to seek 
151. NEW ENG. COURANT, No. 77, Jan. 14-28,1723. 
152. NEW ENG. COURANT, No. 79, Jan. 28-Feb. 4,1723. 
153. NEW ENG. COURANT, No. 80, Feb. 4-11. 1723. 
154. AMERICAN WKLY. MERCURY, Feb. 26.1723. 
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to suppress criticism directly. One historian has counted at least twenty instances 
before 1776 where authors or printers were brought before a house of a colonial 
legislature to answer for their statements. ISS 
Of course, colonial Americans knew that the Executive, whether King or 
Governor, could well act alone to repress a free press. In 1747, for example, 
Governor George Clinton of New York fought with that state's Assembly.136 
After the governor criticized the Assembly for insufficient funding for the 
military, the Assembly prepared a remonstrance againstthe Governor. Governor 
Clinton then ordered James Parker, the official printer for the Assembly and 
editor of Weekly Post Boy, not to publish the remonstrance. IS' The Assembly 
voted unanimously that the remonstrance should be printed, stating that "his 
Excellency'S Order to forbid the printing or re-printing the said Remonstrance 
is unwarrantable, arbitrary and illegal," and that publication was necessary to 
demonstrate the Assembly'S "firm Resolution to preserve the Liberty of the 
Press."IS8 
The trial of John Peter Zenger in 1735 highlighted the colonial distrust of 
judicial oversight of the press. IS9 Zenger's newspaper, the New York Weekly 
Joumal, had been a leading proponent for a vigorous free press since it was first 
published on November 5, 1733. One of its initial issues contained an essay 
detailing the logic behind opposition to governmental censorship: 
If Men in Power were always Men oflntegrity, we might venture to trust 
them with the Direction of the Press, and there would be no Occasion to 
plead againstthe Restraint of it; but as they have Vices like their fellows, 
so it very often happens that the best intended and the most valuable 
Writings are Objects of their Resentment, because opposite to their own 
Tempers or Designs. 160 
The Weekly Joumal also published criticism of government officials, and 
Zenger was put on trial for seditious libel on August 4, 1735. The judge in the 
case, Chief Justice James DeLancey, ruled that under English common law the 
truth was not a defense, 161 and it was for the judge to determine if a printed 
155. See JEFFERY A. SMITH, PRINTERS AND PRESS FREEDOM: THE IDEOLOGY OF EARLY 
AMERICAN JOURNALISM 83 (1988). 
156. See Jeffrey A. Smith, A Reappraisal of Legislalive Privilege and American Colonial 
Journalism, 61 JOURNALISM Q. 97, toO-tol (1984); see also LEVY, supra note 66, at 45-46. 
157. See LEVY, supra note 66, at 45; Smith, supra note 156, at 100. 
IS8. 1 JOURNAL OF THE VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE 
COLONY OF NEW YORK 671-72 (1766); 2 JOURNAL OF THE VOTES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
GENERAL ASSEMBLYOFTHECOLONYOFNEWYORK 191-93, 198(1766). Leonard Levy has pointed 
out that the New York Assembly was more than a little hypocritical, as it felt free to imprison 
printers whose writings criticized the Assembly. See LEVY, supra note 66, at 46-47. 
159. See SMITH, supra note 155, at 83 ("Court trials for seditious libel were seldom attempted 
in America between the Zenger case in 1735 and the Sedition Act of 1798."). 
160. James Alexander, N.Y. WKLY. J., Nov. 19, 1733. 
161. See FREEDOM OF THE PREss FROM ZENGER TO JEFFERSON 47 (Leonard W. Levy ed., 
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statement "make a Lybel" against the government. 162 The sole job of the jury 
was to decide if the accused had printed the material before the court. 163 
Zenger's attorney, Andrew Hamilton, conceded that Zenger had published the 
material,l64 but argued both that the making of a truthful charge should not be a 
crime 165 and that the jury, not the judge, should decide whether a statement is 
libelous. 166 He explained his distrust of the judiciary's deciding on the 
criminality of those who complain against the government: . 
I think it will be agreed, That ever since the Time of the Star Chamber, 
where the most arbitrary and destructive Judgments and Opinions were 
given, that ever an Englishman heard of, at least in his own Country: I 
say, Prosecutions for Libels since the Time of that arbitrary Court ... 
have generally been set on Foot at the Instance of the Crown or its 
Ministers; and ... these Prosecutions were too often and too much 
countenanced by the Judges, who held their Places at Pleasure, (a 
disagreeable Tenure to any Officer, but a dangerous one in the Case of 
a Judge.)167 
Hamilton argued that existing law not only presented a danger by giving too 
much power to judges, it weakened the protection of the innocent by depriving 
juries of the right to make the critical determination on the criminality of a 
publication. 168 Finally, he pleaded directly to the jury "as Men who have baffled 
the Attempt of Tyranny." 169 
The judge instructed the jury to ignore Hamilton's argument and find Zenger 
guilty for printing the material he had previously admitted to printing. 170 The 
jury quickly returned a verdict of not guilty, "[u]pon which there were three 
Huzzas in the Hall which was crowded with people.,,171 
It became an article of faith for those in the colonies that the jury was an 
essential buffer against abuses of authority, whether by governors, parliaments, 
or judges. One colonial writer described the principle that there be no conviction 
without a jury verdict as ''the glorious Security thereby given for Freedom in 
writing and speaking.,,172 
1966) [hereinafter FREEDOM OF THE PRESS). 
162. Id. at 60. 
163. See id. at 51. 
164. See id. at 44. 
165. See id. at 46. 
166. See id. at SO-S\. 
167. Id. at 55. 
168. See id. at 51. "This [practice] ofleaving it to the Judgment of the Court, whether the 
Words are libellous or not, in Effect renders Juries useless (to say no worse) in many Cases .... " 
Id. 
169. Id. at 59. 
170. See id. at 60-6\. 
171. Id. at 61. 
172. Smith, supra note 26, at 1420. 
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Liberty in America was seen as protectionfrom, not by, colonial judges. In 
the Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson included the symbiotic 
relationship between the judiciary and the King in the list of grievances: "He has 
obstructed the Administration of Justice, by refusing his Assent to Laws for 
establishing Judiciary Powers. He has made Judges dependent on his Will alone, 
for the tenure of their offices, and the amount and payment of their salaries.,,173 
By the time of the Revolution, Americans were well aware that their liberty, 
especially their liberty of the press, could be attacked by all branches of 
government. 
When the Constitution for the new United States was drafted, there was, 
naturally, no provision protecting a free press because there was no Bill of 
Rights. It was argued that because the Constitution limited the areas in which the 
new federal government could act, there was not only no need for a Bill of 
Rights, but that its very inclusion might imply greater, and more ominous power, 
for the national government.174 
While no one spoke against the need for "liberty of the press," many felt it 
was an invaluable, but undefinable concept. Benjamin Franklin wrote in 1789: 
"Few of us, I believe, have distinct Ideas oflts Nature and Extent."m Alexander 
Hamilton agreed, and wrote in the Federalist Papers: "What signifies a 
declaration that 'the liberty ofthe press shall be inviolably preserved?' What is 
the liberty of the press? Who can give it any definition which would not leave the 
utmost latitude for evasion?,,176 
The reality was somewhat different than this pessimistic assessment. 177 It is 
true that the outerlimits of liberty of the press were ill-defined and improperly 
understood. 178 The most significant question, which was to dominate discussion 
of the constitutionality ofthe Sedition Act of 1798, was the protection given for 
criticism of the government, specifically whether the English concept of seditious 
libel could co-exist with freedom of the press. 179 There was, however, wide-
173. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 10-11 (U.S. 1776). 
174. See. e.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 513-14 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter 
ed., 1961). "For why declare that things shall not be done which there is no power to do? Why, for 
instance, should it be said that the liberty of the press shall not be restrained, when no power is 
given by which restrictions may be imposed?" Id. at 515. 
175. BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, THE COURT OF THE PREss (1789), reprinted in 10 THE WRITINGS 
OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN 37 (Albert Smyth ed., 1907). 
176. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, supra note 174, at 514. 
177. See. e.g., David A. Anderson, The Origins o/the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L. REV. 455, 
537 (1983) ("[M]ost of the Framers perceived, however dimly, naively, or incompletely, that 
freedom of the press was inextricably related to the new republican form of government and would 
have to be protected if their vision of government by the people was to succeed."). 
178. See. e.g., LEVY, supra note 66, at 348 ("The First Amendment's injunction, that there 
shall be no law abridging the freedom of speech or press, was boldly stated if narrowly 
understood. "). 
179. An early awareness of this issue can be seen in a 1789 letter from William Cushing to 
John Adams, where Cushing argued that liberty of the press: 
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spread consensus on at least one critical principle: Liberty of the press must 
mean, at a bare minimum, no prior restraint. In other words, the substance 
protected by the First Amendment was not always clearly understood, but all 
appreciated that limitations imposed prior to publishing were simply 
unacceptable. 
One of the earliest comprehensive definitions of liberty of the press came 
from James Wilson at the Pennsylvania state convention ratifying the 
Constitution. On December 1, 1787, Wilson, who was later to serve as a Justice 
on the first United States Supreme Court, declared: 
The idea of the liberty of the press, is not carried so far as this 
[permitting libels to go unpunished] in any country-what is meant by 
the liberty of the press is, that there should be no antecedent restraint 
upon it; but that every author is responsible when he attacks the security 
or welfare of the government, or the safety, character and property of the 
individual. 
With regard to attacks upon the public, the mode of proceeding is by 
a prosecution .... [I]t must be tried where it was published, if the 
indictment is for publishing; and it must be tried likewise by a jury of 
that State. ISO 
When Justice Joseph Story described the scope of liberty of the press 
protected by the First Amendment, he built on works concerning the English 
experience by William Blackstone and Jean DeLolme. 181 Justice Story 
condemned "previous restraints," whether coming from a licensor or ajudge: 
must exclude subsequent restraints, as much as previous restraints. In other words, if 
all men are restrained by the fear of jails, scourges and loss of ears from examining the 
conduct of persons in administration and where their conduct is illegal, tyrannical and 
tending to overthrow the Constitution and introduce slavery, are so restrained from 
declaring it to the public thai will be as effectual a restraint as any previous restraint 
whatever. 
[d. at 199. 
180. Statement at Pennsylvania ratifying convention, PENNSYLVANIA AND THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION: 1787-1788, at 308·09 (John Bach McMaster & Frederick D. Stone eds., Da Capo 
Press 1970) ( 1888) (emphasis added). 
181. See STORY, supra note 123, §§ 1878-79 (quoting BLACKSTONE, supra note 122; 
DELOLME, supra note 119). Blackstone's famous description of prior restraints shows his 
preference, if not enthusiasm for "subsequent punishment" of the press: 
To subject the press to the restrictive power of a licenser. as was formerly done, both 
before and since the revolution [of 1688], is to subject all freedom of sentiment to the 
prejudices of one man, and make him the arbitrary and infallible judge of all 
controverted points in learning. religion, and government. But to punish (as the law 
does at present) any dangerous or offensive writings, which, when published. shall on 
a fair and impartial trial be adjudged of a pernicious tendency. is necessary for the 
preservation of peace and good order .... 
BLACKSTONE, supra note 122, at 152. 
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[T]he liberty of the press, as understood by all England, is the right to 
publish without any previous restraint. or license; so that neither the 
courts of justice. nor other persons. are authorized to take notice of 
writings intended for the press; but are confined to those which are 
printed. And, in such cases, if their character is questioned, whether 
they are lawful, or libelous, is to be tried by ajury, according to the due 
proceedings of law:s2 -
The understanding of the full scope of liberty of the press underwent a 
revolution a few years after ratification of the First Amendment, with the 
enactment of the Alien and Sedition Acts. This revolution continues today. 
However, from the beginning, there has been universal understanding that there 
could be no liberty of the press without a prohibition against previous restraints. 
No government official, judicial or otherwise, may be permitted to restrict the 
press prior to publication. 
B. The Consensus Surrounding the Sedition Act 
The Sedition Act of 1798 made it a crime to write "any false, scandalous and 
mal icious" statements against either the President or Congress. 183 While the law 
permitted a defendant to escape penalty by proving the truth of the writing, and 
juries were permitted to decide critical questions of law and fact, there was no 
doubt that the Act was intended to silence critics of the entrenched political 
powers. 
Supporters of the Act stated that the law was constitutional because it did not 
involve a prior restraint, but merely penalized speech after it had occurred: 
[T]he liberty of the press consists not in a license for every man to 
publish what he pleases without being liable to punishment, ifhe should 
abuse this license to the injury of others, but in a permission to publish, 
without previous restraint, whatever he may think proper, being 
answerable to the public and individuals, for any abuse of this 
permission to their prejudice. l84 
John Marshall also defended the Sedition Act in his Report on the Minority 
on the Virginia Resolutions, as being consistent with the First Amendment 
because it did not impose a prior restraint. ISS "It is known to all," he wrote, that 
182. [d. (emphasis added). It is noteworthy that in his treatise on equity, Justice Story 
equated injunctions on libel with the Star Chamber. See JOSEPH STORY, II COMMENTARIES ON 
EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE 136-37 (12th ed. 1887) (stating that courts of equity "have never assumed, 
at least since the destruction of the Court of Star Chamber, to restrain any publication which 
purports to be a literary work. upon the mere ground that it is of a libellous character"). 
183. The Sedition Act of 1798, ch. 74. I Stat. 596 (1798). 
184. 5 ANNALS OF CONGo 2987-2990, 3003-14 (1799), reprinted in FREEDOM OFTHE PRESS. 
supra note 161, at 1173-74. 
185. See John Marshall. Report of the Minority on the Virginia Resolutions, J. House of 
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those who publish libels or who "libel the government of the state," may "be both 
sued and indicted."'86 However, he added: 
[T]he liberty of the press is a term which has a definite and appropriate 
signification, completely understood. It signifies a liberty to publish, 
free from previous restraint, any thing and every thing at the discretion 
of the printer only, but not the liberty of spreading with impunity false 
and scandalous slanders which may destroy the peace and mangle the 
reputation of an individual or of a community.,s7 
The opponents of the Sedition Act did not disagree with the contention that 
prior restraints were prohibited under the First Amendment. They instead argued 
that protection against priorrestraints was a necessary, but insufficient, condition 
to guarantee freedom of expression. 
James Madison, for example, criticized the Act declaring: "It would seem 
a mockery to say that no laws should be passed preventing publications from 
being made, but that laws might be passed for punishing them in case they should 
be made.,,'88 Madison argued that freedom of the press meant not only a ban on 
prior restraints, but much more as well: 
This security of the freedom of the press requires that it should be 
exempt nol only from previous restraint by the Executive, as in Great 
Britain, but from legislative restraint also; and this exemption, to be 
effectual, must be an exemption not only from the previous inspection 
of licensers, but from the subsequent penalty of laws. '89 
The Sedition Act expired by its own terms in 1801. In 1964, the Supreme 
Delegates (Va) 6:93-95 (Jan. 22, 1799), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITImON 136-38 
(Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (emphasis added); see also Respublica v. Dennie, 
4 Yeates 267 (1805). Judge Jasper Yeates instructed a jury on a charge of seditious libel: 
There shall be no licenses of the press. Publish as you please in the first instance 
without control; but you are answerable both to the community and the individual. if 
you proceed to unwarrantable lengths. . .. [I)f the consciences of the jury shall be 
clearly satisfied that the publication was seditiously. maliciously, and willfully aimed 
at the independence of the United States, the constitution thereof, or of this state, they 
should convict the defendant. 
Id. at 269. 271. The defendant, publisher Joseph Dennie. was eventually acquitted after ajury trial. 
See LEVY. supra note 66, at 341. 
186. THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION, supra note 185, at 138 (quoting John Marshall). 
187. Id. (quoting John Marshall). 
188. James Madison, The Virginia Report of J 799-J 800. ToUching the Alien and Sedition 
Laws, reprinted in THE FOUNDERS' CONSTInrrION, supra note 185, at 141-42. 
189. [d. (emphasis added). This reasoning was repeated by St. George Tucker, who annotated 
the work of Blackstone for application to the American system. See st. George Tucker. 
Blackstone's Commentaries: with Notes of Reference. to the Constitution and Laws of the Federal 
Government of the United States; and the Commonwealth of Virginia (1803), reprinted in 
FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, supra note 161, at 324. 
324 INDIANA LA W REVIEW [Vol. 34:295 
Court finally agreed that Madison's fuller understanding ofthe First Amendment 
was correct, and the Court explicitly granted constitutional protection to criticism 
of government officials: "[T]he attack upon [the Sedition Act's] validity has 
carried the day in the court ofhistory.,,19o 
The primary lesson of the Sedition Act is that the "profound national 
commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, 
robust, and wide-open,,,191 requires that discussion of public issues be free from 
subsequent punishment. Opponents of the Sedition Act, however, uniformly 
acknowledged that such freedom was needed in addition to freedom from prior 
restraint. Both are necessary for the preservation of free expression. 
C. Judicial Understanding of Prior Restraints Before Near v. Minnesota 
1. Injunctions Against Libels as Prior Restraints.-After th~ end of the 
Sedition Act, prosecutions for seditious libel ceased to be a serious threat to 
Nineteenth Century freedom of expression. While common law libel actions 
were often successful, state court judges throughout the country recognized what 
modem scholars had forgotten: A fundamental connection exists between the 
traditional rule that courts may not enjoin libels and the doctrine of prior 
restraints. 192 
It had long been a maxim in English common law that "equity will not enjoin 
a libel.,,193 In 1827, New York enacted a law codifying the similar prevailing 
American view that the press, even when guilty oflibel, should not be subject to 
restraints in advance of future publication.194 The law, which permitted criminal 
courts to require guilty parties to "give security to keep the peace," explicitly 
exempted libels and other writing offenses. 195 It stated, ''this section shall not 
extend to convictions for writing or publishing any libel; nor shall any such 
security be hereafter required by any court, upon any complaint, prosecution or 
conviction, for any such writing or publishing.,,196 It was later remarked that this 
provision reflected the legislature's determination that, in regards to a free press, 
"a power of preventive justice ... cannot safely be entrusted to any tribunal 
consistently with the principles of a free government.,,197 
The first state court decision to recognize explicitly the link between 
injunctions on libel and prior restraints was the 1839 New York case of 
190. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 276 (1964). 
191. Id. at 270. 
192. These libel cases only involved state causes of actions, because the U.S. Supreme Court 
ruled in 1812 that there was no common law jurisdiction in the federal cqurts. See United States 
v. Hudson & Goodwin, II U.S. 32 (1812). 
193. See supra notes 106-11 and accompanying text. 
194. 2 N.Y. REv. STAT. 737, § I (1827-88). 
195. Id. 
196. Id. 
197. Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige Ch. 24, 26 (N.Y. 1839). 
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Brandreth v. Lance. 198 The seller of "Brandreth's Vegetable Universal PiIls,,,I99 
had sought to enjoin publication of a made'-up "autobiography.,,2oo The court 
dismissed the complaint, stating that it could not assume jurisdiction "without 
infringing upon liberty of the press."201 Chancellor Walworth's opinion stressed 
that for a court to enjoin a publication would mark a dangerous return to the days 
ofthe Star Chamber: 
The court of star chamber in England, once exercised the power of 
cutting off the ears, branding the foreheads, and slitting the noses of the 
libellers of important personages. And, as an incident to such a 
jurisdiction, that court was undoubtedly in the habit of restraining the 
publication of such libels by injunction.202 
Chancellor Walworth then stated that, since the end of the Star Chamber, 
only one court "either in this country or in England, has attempted, by an 
injunction or order of the court, to prohibit or restrain the pUblication of a libel, 
as such, in anticipation."203 He added with evident satisfaction that "[t]he house 
of commons, however, considered this extraordinary exercise of power on the 
part of [the notorious] Scroggs as a proper subject of impeachment.,,204 
In 1876, the Missouri Court of Appeals denied an insurance company's 
request to enjoin a libel, stating that such an injunction would violate Missouri's 
constitutional guarantee of free speech.20s The court held that even if the 
insolvency of the defendant meant that there was no adequate remedy at law, the 
constitutional guarantee forbade injunctions against speech: 
It is obvious that, if this remedy be given on the ground of the 
insolvency of the defendant, the freedom to speak and write, which is 
secured, by the Constitution of Missouri, to all its citizens, will be 
198. Id. at 24. 
199. Id. 
200. See id. 
201. Id. at 26. 
202. /d. at 24 (citation omitted). While it was perhaps technically inaccurate to say that the 
Star Chamber issued formal "injunctions" against libels, see Roscoe Pound, Equitable Relief 
Against Defamation and Injuries to Personality, 29 HARV. L. REv. 640, 650 (1916), the Star 
Chamber unquestionably exercised coercive preventative power over printing both through its 
licensing authority and its ability to prosecute offenders without ajury. See supra notes 27-58 and 
accompanying text. 
203. Brandreth,8 Paige, Ch. at 26. 
204. [d, (citation omitted). Lord Chief Justice William Scroggs had imposed a ban on the 
publication of a book in 1680. See Trial of Henry Carr, 7 State Trials 1111, 1115 (1680). Scroggs 
was impeached by the House of Commons ten years later. Proceedings against Lord Chief Justice 
Scroggs were brought before the Privy Council. See 8 State Trials 163, 199 (1680). 
205. See Life Ass'n of Am. v. Boogher, 3 Mo. App. 173 (1876). Missouri's constitutional 
free speech provision stated: "[E]very person may freely speak, write, or print on any subject, being 
responsible for the abuse ofthat liberty." Id. at 180. 
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enjoyed by a man able to respond in damages to a civil action, and 
denied to one who has no property liable to an execution.206 
Finally, the court rejected the plea for a temporary injunction while the 
merits of the defamation action were being considered, explaining that "[w]e 
have no power to suspend that right for a morrient, or for any purpose.,,207 The 
court ended by explaining that ajudicially imposed injunction was the equivalent 
of the censor's licensing power as a forbidden prior restraint on speech.208 "The 
sovereign power has forbidden any instrumentality of the government it has 
instituted to limit or restrain this right except by the fear of the penalty, civil or 
criminal, which may wait on abuse.,,209 
One year after the Missouri decision, the New York Court of Common Pleas 
agreed that a temporary injunction against an alleged libel would violate the 
state's constitutional guarantee of free speech.210 The New York Juvenile 
Guardian Society had sued to enjoin Teddy Roosevelt, a commissioner of the 
State Board of Charities, from publishing the results of an investigation which 
found misuse of the charity's funds. The court declared that a court of equity had 
no power to restrain defamatory publications and linked this rule to freedom of 
expression: 
[T]he exercise of any such jurisdiction being repugnant to the provision 
of the Constitution, which declares (art. I, § 8) that every citizen may 
freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects. being 
responsible for the abuse of that right; and that no law shall be passed to 
restain [ sic] or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press.211 
This principle was reaffirmed by the New York Court of Appeals in 1902, 
which stated the enjoining oflibels interfered with both freedom of the press and 
the right to a jury trial. 212 The court stated that: 
[Enjoining libels] would open the door for a judge sitting in equity to 
establish a censorship not only over the past and present conduct of a 
publisher of a magazine or newspaper. but would authorize such judge 
206. ld. at 176. 
207. ld. at 180. 
208. See id. 
209. ld. (emphasis added). This principle was reaffirmed by the Missouri Supreme Court in 
Flint v. Hutchinson Smoke Burner Co., 19 S.W. 804 (Mo. 1892). The Missouri Supreme Court 
stated that there were "exceptions in star chamber times, but such exceptions serve to make firm the 
general rule that a court of equity possessed no such power." ld. at 806. The court in Flint 
concluded that enjoining libels violated both freedom of the press and the right to a jury 
detennination. See id. at 805; accordWolfv. Harris,I84 S.W. I 139 (Mo. 1916}; Hamilton-Brown 
Shoe Co. v. Saxey, 323 S.W. 1106 (Mo. I 895). 
210. See N.Y. Juvenile Guardian Soc'y v. Roosevelt, 7 Daly 188 (N.Y. Ct. Common Pleas 
1877). 
211. ld. at 191. 
212. See Marlin Fire Arms Co. v. Shields, 64 N.E. 163 (N.Y. 1902). 
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by decree to lay down a chart for future guidance in so far as a plaintiff s 
property rights might seem to require .... 213 
327 
Probably the most extensive discussion of the link between injunctions 
against defamation and prior restraints in the Nineteenth Century, came from an 
1882 decision of the Louisiana Supreme Court in State ex rei. Liversey v. Judge 
of Civil District Court.214 In that case, W. Van Benthuysen obtained an 
injunction against a newspaper, The Mascot, ordering it not to publish libelous 
cartoons against him. When the paper published more cartoons, its publisher was 
held in contempt. The Louisiana Supreme Court not only declared the injunction 
unconstitutional, the court also annulled the publisher's contempt conviction on 
the ground that the injunction was void.2IS 
The Louisiana Supreme Court began by stating that even though the language 
of its constitutional guarantee that "no law shall be passed abridging the freedom 
of the press" differed in language from the u.S. Constitution and like provisions 
in other states,216 "they all signify the same thing, and convey the general idea 
which is crystallized in the common phrase, 'liberty of the press.",217 Quoting 
a law dictionary, the court acknowledged the link between injunctions and other 
fonns of prior restraints: "The favorite idea in England and America has been 
that every person may freely publish what he sees fit, and any judgment of the 
law upon it shall be reserved till afterwards.,,218 After describing the prohibition 
against all forms of prior restraint, the court stated, "[p ]erhaps in the whole range 
of legal propositions, susceptible of dispute, there is not one that commands so 
unanimous a concurrence of judges andjurists."zI9 
The court then noted the difficulty in ascertaining whether particular 
statements were defamatory or not, and whether or not they were privileged. 
Because ofthis lack of certainty, "[t]here would be no safe course, except to take 
the opinion of the judge beforehand, or to abstain entirely from alluding to the 
plaintiff. What more complete censorship could be established?,,220 The court 
conc1uded that such a scheme would have a devastating effect on freedom ofthe 
press: "Under the operation of such a law, with a subservient or corrupt 
213. Id. at 165. 
214. 34 La. Ann. 741 (La. 1882). 
215. See id. at 742. 
216. Id. at 743 (quoting the Louisiana Bill of Rights). The court noted that Maine's 
constitutional provision was typical of states such as New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania. 
Delaware, Maryland, Ohio, and lIIinois: "Every citizen may freely speak, write and publish his 
sentiments on any subject, being responsible for the abuse of this liberty." [d. at 744 (quoting the 
Maine Constitution). The court stated that although these provisions "are fuller in expression" than 
Louisiana's, they "are merely intended to convey the recognition of the same geneml principle, 
'liberty of the press' as a fundamental right of the citizen." Id. 
217. Id.at743. 
218. Id. (citation omitted). 
219. [d. 
220. Id. at 745. 
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judiciary, the press might be completely muzzled, and its just influence upon 
public opinion entirely paralyzed.,,221 
Upon concluding that an injunction against defamatory statements violated 
liberty of the press, the court then ruled that the publisher could not be punished 
for violating the injunction: "[W]here the court had no power to grant the 
injunction, and where the mandate is, therefore, absolutely void, the defendants 
cannot be punished for contempt for its alleged violation.,,222 
Similarly, two Texas state courts' injunctions against defamatory statements 
were also found to violate that state's constitutional protection for freedom of 
expression. In a 1909 case, Mitchell v. Grand Lodge, Free & Accepted Masons 
o/Texas,223 the court ruled that the state's "constitutional guaranty of liberty of 
speech furnishes an additional reason for the application in Texas of the general 
rule that an injunction will not issue to restrain the publication of a libel.,,224 In 
1923, another Texas court agreed, stating that the purpose ofthat constitutional 
provision "is to preserve the liberty of speech ... and to inhibit a court of equity 
from supervising one person's opinion of another or from dictating what one 
person may say of another ... .'>22S 
The Alabama constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press was similarly 
held to bar injunctions against defamation.226 In 1909, a U.S. District Court held 
221. /d. 
222. Id. at 746 (citations omitted). The court explained that the publisher could be punished 
pending final review of his violation of the injunction, but the punishment would end thereafter: 
He must endure the consequences of his disobedience until, in some orderly course of 
procedure, he procures from competent authority the annulment ofthe mandate claimed 
to be unconstitutional and void; but the moment such annulment is pronounced, his 
condemnation for contempt falls with it, and his sentence, though not completely 
executed, expires. 
Id. Some courts, however, held that even if an injunction against a libel was improper, a party 
violating that injunction could still be held in contempt. See Christian Hosp. v. People ex rei. 
Murphy, 79 N.E. 72,74 (III. 1906). This was also the position of the U.S. Supreme Court in 
adopting the collateral bar rule. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 317-21 (1967). 
223. 121 S.W. 178 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909). 
224. Id. at 179. The relevant Texas constitutional provision stated: 
Every person shall be at liberty to speak, write or publish his opinions on any subject, 
being responsible for the abuse of that privilege; and no law shall ever be passed 
curtailing the liberty of speech or of the press .... And in all indictments for libels, the 
jury shall have the right to determine the law and the facts, under the direction of the 
court, as in other cases. 
TEX CONST. art. I, § 8 (2000). 
225. Strang v. Biggers, 252 S. W. 826, 826 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923). The court went on to add 
that although libels could not be enjoined, they could be punished, because the law held "all 
persons accountable for the misuse of this right of free speech." Id. 
226. The Alabama Constitution states that "no law shall ever be passed to curtail o~ restrain 
the liberty of speech or of the press; and any person may speak, write, and publish his sentiments 
on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that liberty." ALA CONST. art. I, § 4. 
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that the Alabama state constitution forbade enjoining a libel defaming the 
plaintiffs credit and business standing. 
The wrongs and injury, which often occur from lack of preventive means 
to suppress slander, are parts of the price which the people, by their 
organic law, have declared it is better to pay, than to encounter the evils 
which might result if the court were allowed to take the alleged slanderer 
or libeler by the throat, in advance.227 
Eight years later, another U.S. District Court in Alabama refused to enjoin 
a defamatory attack on the maker of an alcohol-laced medicine, stating, "it is not 
within the authority of any court, or of any other governmental agency, by any 
sort of censorship to abridge the right belonging to every man to freely speak and 
publish his sentiments.,,228 
Similar holdings were reached by other federal courts. In a 1900 case from 
Oregon, an injunction for a libel was denied: "The court cannot assume to 
supervise the publication of offending newspapers, or otherwise constitute itself 
a press censor. ,,229 In a 1907 case interpreting South Dakota's constitutional right 
to free expression, the court concluded, "[i]n the jurisprudence of the United 
States there is no remedy for the abuse of this right ... except an action at law 
for damages or a criminal proceeding by indictment or information.,,23o 
In 1916, the Nebraska Supreme Court joined the list of courts which 
explicitly linked the equitable ban on enjoining defamations with the 
constitutional prohibition on prior restraints.23I The court, in refusing to enjoin 
publication of a false statement that a candidate was not actually running for 
Governor, declared: "The power to exercise a censorship over political 
publications, as formerly practiced, is taken away. The exercise of censorship 
by a court of equity through the writ of injunction is no less objectionable than 
the exercise of that function by other departments of the government. ,,232 
The cases detailed in this section prove, that from the very beginning of the 
Republic, American courts have understood that permitting libels to be enjoined 
gave judges the same censorial control over prospective speech as had been 
wielded by licensors of old.233 The following few sections of this Article 
227. Citizens' Light, Heat & Power Co. v. Montgomery Light & Water Power Co., 171 F. 
553, 556 (M.D. Ala 1909). 
228. Willis v. O'Connell, 231 F. 1004,1010 (S.D. Ala. 1916). 
229. Balliet v. Cassidy, 104 F. 704, 706 (D. Or. 1900). 
230. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. S.D. Retail Merchs.' & Hardware Dealers' Ass'n, 150 F. 
413,418 (D. S.D. 1907)( citations omitted). The South Dakota Constitution states, "[e]very person 
may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right." 
S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 5. 
231. See Howell v. Bee Pub. Co., 158 N.W. 358 (Neb. 1916). 
232. Id. at 359. 
233. Many of the courts that denied injunctions for defamatory statements merely cited the 
equitable rule without mentioning the constitutional interest in free expression. Some judges, such 
as Supreme Court Justice Bradley, sitting on circuit in Kidd v. Horry, 28 F. 773, 776 (E.D. Pa. 
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illustrate questions about enjoining speech intertwined with conduct, such as 
picketing or parades, which have been difficult for courts to resolve. 
Nonetheless, there remained wide-spread agreement that an injunction against 
pure speech was an impermissible prior restraint. 
2. Prior Restraints and Labor Disputes.-Labor disputes around the tum of 
the 20th century presented courts with the challenge of applying principles of 
free expression in a novel and volatile context. While many courts focused 
primarily on the threat of violence or potential harm to businesses, a number of 
courts did understand that injunctions against the speech and protests of unions 
could very well violate the traditional prohibition against prior restraints. 
When "boycotting" a business was held to be an illegal conspiracy, 
injunctions against speeches and circulars in support of such boycotts were freely 
granted. In 1911, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the one-year jail term for 
Samuel Gompers for violating an injunction that had barred the urging of a 
boycott against Buck's Stove and Range Company or publishing the name of the 
company on "Unfair Lists.,,234 The Court said that the injunction did not violate 
freedom of expression because the prohibited words were a signal to implement 
an illegal conspiracy.2J5 Thus, the.injunction was not against pure speech, but 
against "verbal acts," which, the Court added, were as much subject to being 
enjoined "as the use of any other force whereby property is unlawfully 
damaged.,,2J6 
There were many simi lar decisions. As Felix Frankfurter and Nathan Greene 
wrote in their 1930 book, The Labor Injunction, the injunction became the 
1886), tied the ban on enjoining defamations to the constitutional requirement ofajury trial. Most 
judges. however, just cited the rule that equity will not enjoin a libel. See. e.g., Francis v. Flinn, 
118 U.S. 385 (1886); Robert E. Hicks Corp. v. Nat'l Salesmen's Training Ass'n, 19 F.2d 963 (7th 
Cir. 1927); Vassar Coli. v. Loose-Wiles Biscuit Co., 197 F. 982 (W.O. Mo. 1912); Edison v. 
Thomas A. Edison, Jr. Chem. Co., 128 F. 1013 (D. Del. 1904); Computing Scale Co. v. Nat'l 
Computing Scale Co., 79 F. 962 (N.D. Ohio 1897); Baltimore Car-Wheel Co. v. Bemis, 29 F. 95 
(D. Mass. 1886); Donaldson v. Wright, 7 App. D.C. '45 (1895); Singer Mfg. Co. v. Domestic 
Sewing Mach. Co., 49 Ga. 70 (1873); Allegretti Chocolate Cream Co. v. Rubel, 83 111. App. 558 
(1899); Everett Piano Co. v. Bent, 60 Ill. App. 372 (1895); Raymond v. Russell, 9N.E. 544 (Mass. 
1887); Whitehead v. Kitson 119, Mass. 484 (1876); Boston Diatite Co. v. Florence Mfg. Co., 114 
Mass. 69 (1873); Flint v. Hutchinson Smoke Burner Co., 19 S.W. 804 (Mo. 1892); Mayer v. 
Journeymen Stone-Cutters' Ass'n, 20 A. 492 (N.J. Ch. 1890); Owen v. Partridge, 82 N.Y.S. 248 
(Sup. Ct. 1903); Maugerv. Dick, 55 How. Pro 132 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1878). One such court ruled that 
the equity rule was not based on constitutional reasons and could be changed by statute. See 
Chamber of Commerce of Minneapolis V. FTC, 13 F.2d 673 (8th Cir. 1926). A small minority of 
courts actually ruled that libels could be enjoined. See Warren Featherbone Co. V. Landauer, 15 I 
F. 130 (E.D. Wis. 1903); Emack V. Kane, 34 F. 46 (N.D. Ill. 1888); see also Palmerv. Travers, 20 
F. 501 (S.D.N.Y. 1884) (permitting injunction for libel if defendant threatens repetition). 
234. Gompers V. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418 (1911). 
235. See id. at 439. 
236. [d. 
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central lever in the administration of just ice between employer and employee.237 
While some courts enjoined publications which were accompanied by ''threats, 
express or covert, or intimidation and coercion,,,238 others went so far as to bar 
speech that was merely "annoying" or "indecent," or that contained "opprobrious 
epithets. ,,239 
One of the first steps in recognizing that picketing and persuasion in the labor 
context could be protected without sanctioning violence and illegality came in 
a dissent by Oliver Wendell Holmes in an 1896 Massachusetts case.240 The 
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court upheld enjoining, as a nuisance, a two-
person picket in front of a factory.241 Holmes condemned as "unwarranted" the 
"assumption that the patrol necessarily carries with it a threat of bodily harm.,,242 
Holmes also criticized the use of the word ''threats'' in labor injunctions, noting 
that a threat is not necessarily unlawful; "it depends on what you threaten.,,243 
The most eloquent defense of freedom of expression in the labor context 
came from the Montana Supreme Court in 1908. In Lindsay & Co. v. Montana 
Federation of Labor,244 the court struck down a lower court order enjoining a 
labor union from distributing written materials "containing opprobrious or 
injurious epithets.,,245 The court said that for a judge to tell an individual what 
not to publish, even regarding a "conspiracy to boycott," is analogous to if the 
court were to "determine in advance just what the citizen mayor may not speak 
or write upon a given subject-is, in fact, to say that such court is a censor of 
speech as well as of the press.,,246 Referring to the state's constitution,241 the 
court declared: 
It cannot be said that a citizen of Montana is free to publish whatever he 
will on any subject, while an injunction preventing him from publishing 
a particular item upon a particular subject hangs over his head like a 
sword of Damocles, ready to fall with all the power which can be 
invoked in contempt proceedings .... 248 
237. FELIX FRANKFURTER & NATHAN GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION 52 (1930). 
238. Beck v. Ry. Teamsters' Protective Union, 77 N.W. 13,24 (Mich. 1898). 
239. FRANKFURTER & GREENE, supra note 237, at 89-1 06; see also RABBAN, supra note 127, 
at 169-73. 
240. See Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077 (Mass. 1896). 
241. See id. at 1078. 
242. Id. at 1080 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
243. Id. at 1081 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
244. 96 P. 127 (Mont. 1908). 
245. Id. at 128. 
246. Id. at 131. 
247. The relevant constitutional provision stated: "No law shall be passed impairing the 
freedom of speech; every person shall be free to speak, write, or publish whatever he will on any 
subject, being responsible for all abuse of that liberty." Id. (quoting MONT. CONST. OF 1884, art. 
Ill, § 10). 
248. Id. 
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A similar decision was announced in 1902 by the Missouri Supreme Court.249 
In refusing to enjoin a union from proclaiming or conveying a boycott to others, 
the court stated that such an injunction would be an unconstitutional prior 
restraint: "The two ideas, the one of absolute freedom 'to say, write or publish 
whatever he will on any subject,' coupled with responsibility therefor, and the 
other idea of preventing any such free speech, free writing or free publication can 
not coexist.,,23o 
The Texas Supreme Court also condemned an injunction against a labor 
union, under which union organizers were arrested for contempt for "villifying, 
abusing, or using approbrious epithets" to telephone company employees.231 
Equating the injunction to "a system of only licensed speech or licensed 
printing[,],,2S2 the court declared: 
Let it once be admitted that courts may arrogate the authority of 
deciding what the individual may say and may not say, what he may 
write and may not write, and by an injunction writ require him to adapt 
the expression of his sentiments to only what some judge may deem 
fitting and proper, and there may be readily brought about the very 
condition against which the constitutional guaranty was intended as a 
permanent protection. Liberty of speech will end where such control of 
it begins.2S3 
Courts continued to enjoin picketing and other labor-related expression that 
involved threats of violence or intimidation.2s4 However, a growing number of 
courts realized that "[ u ]nder the name of persuasion, duress may be used; but it 
is duress, not persuasion, that should be restrained and punished."2SS Enjoining 
such persuasion, according to a 1924 Illinois Supreme Court decision, would 
result in labor speech being "subject to the supervision of a censor.,,256 In 
reversing a contempt citation for violating an injunction banning the use ofthe 
word "'scabs,' or other offensive, scurrilous or opprobrious names," the court 
249. See Marx & Hass Jeans Clothing Co. v. Watson, 67 S.W. 391 (Mo. 1902). 
250. /d. at 393. 
251. Ex parte Tucker, 220 S. W. 75, 75 (Tex. 1920) (quoting the District Court of Anderson 
County). 
252. Jd. at 76. 
253. /d. 
254. See Am. Malting Co. v. Keitel, 209 F. 351, 363 (2d Cir. 1913) (enjoining false 
statements designed to cause customers to breach contracts); accord Am. Law Book Co. v. Edward 
Thompson Co., 84 N.Y.S. 225 (Sup. Ct. 1903). 
255. Iron Molders' Union No. 125 v. Allis Chalmers Co., 166 F. 45, 51 (7th Cir. 1908); see 
also Everett Waddey Co. v. Richmond Typographical Union, No. 90, 53 S.E. 273, 278 (Va 1906) 
("The evidence, we think, fails to make a case showing that appellees have in any way so molested, 
annoyed or damaged the appellants in the conduct of their business as to entitle them to the 
extraordinary relief by injunction."). 
256. Vulcan Detinning Co. v. St. Clair, 145 N.E~657, 659 (III. 1924). 
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stated that no court of equity "has the power to restrain and punish members of 
a labor union from speaking, writing or publishing on the subject of a dispute 
between the union and the employer.,,257 
3. Parades and the Perils o/Unlimited Discretion.-Unlike "pure speech," 
the use of public streets for parades or demonstrations necessitates some kind of 
government involvement. Cities have the right to regulate their public 
thoroughfares, both for traffic and for avoiding conflicts with the rights of 
others.258 However, beginning in the mid-1880s, many courts recognized that 
granting government officials unlimited discretion in determining who may use 
the public streets was a dangerous infringement on freedom of expression. 
Many of these early cases involved the Salvation Army, which sought to 
parade and play music in cities throughout the country. From 1884 through 
1886, the Salvation Army paraded through Grand Rapids, Michigan, much to the 
dismay of the local govemment.259 After repeated prosecutions for public 
nuisance ended with acquittals, the city passed an ordinance banning all parades, 
except for funeral and military processions, "without having first obtained the 
consent of the mayor.,,260 The Michigan Supreme Court ruled that it was 
unconstitutional to make the right to communicate on public streets subject "to 
an unregulated official discretion.,,261 The court held it impermissible for "a 
mayor or council to shut off processions of those whose notions did not suit their 
views or tastes, in politics or religion, or any other matter on which men differ. 
When men in authority have arbitrary power, there can be no liberty.,,262 
A similar parade law was struck down by the Kansas Supreme Court in 
1888.263 That court ruled that unlimited discretion over which groups could 
parade violated the right of the people to communicate on political or religious 
issues, and that any regulation must apply in an even-handed manner to every 
speaker: 
All by-laws made to regulate parades must fix the conditions upon 
which all persons or associations can move upon the public streets, 
257. Id. 
258. For an early discussion of this, see State v. While, 5 A. 828 (N.H. 1886). For a 
fascinating discussion of weaknesses of this rule, see C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LIBERTY AND 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH 138-60 (1989). 
259. See In re Frazee, 30 N. W. 72, 74 (Mich. 1886). 
260. Id. at 73. 
261. Id. at 76. 
262. Id. A similar parade law was upheld in Massachusetts in Commonwealth v. Plaisted, 
19 N.E. 224 (Mass. 1889). That court incorrectly distinguished the Frazee case on the mistaken 
ground that the Michigan court had merely ruled that the city council lacked "legislative authority" 
to pass such an ordinance. Jd. at 383. 
263. See Anderson v. City of Wellington, 19 P. 719 (Kan. 1888). In Anderson, members of 
the Salvation Army were arrested for parading in violation of a local ordinance which made is 
"unlawful ... to parade any public street ... without having first obtained in writing the consent 
of the mayor." Jd. at 720. 
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expressly and intelligently; . . . and must not give the power of 
permitting or restraining processions to an unregulated official 
discretion, and thus allow an officer to prevent those with whom he does 
not agree on controverted questions from calling public attention to the 
principles of their party .... 264 
In Illinois, it was held unconstitutional to grant unlimited discretion over 
parades to either the chief of police or the city council.265 As one court noted: 
"When men in authority are permitted in their discretion to exercise power so 
arbitrary, liberty is subverted, and the spirit of our free institutions violated. And 
it is all the same whether that discretion is exercised by one man or several.,,266 
The most impassioned decision striking down a law granting city officials 
unlimited discretion over parades was the Wisconsin Supreme Court in its 1893 
decision, State ex rei. Garrabad v. Dering.267 The court stated that authorizing 
such discretion resembled "a petty tyranny, the result of prejudice, bigotry, and 
intolerance, [more] than any fair or legitimate provision in the exercise of the 
police power ofthe state.,,268 The court concluded with a powerful denunciation 
of the evils of unlimited discretion: 
It is entirely un-American and in contlict with the principles of our 
institutions and all modern ideas of civil liberty. It is susceptible of 
being applied to offensive and improper uses, made subversive of the 
rights of private citizens, and it interferes with and abridges their 
privileges and immunities, and denies them the equal protection of the 
laws .... 269 
4. Banning Newspapers.-Of all the attempts to control free expression, 
none is a more blatant violation of the traditional ban on prior restraints than the 
direct legislative ban on a particular publication. Prior to Near, several localities 
tried to enact such bans, which were uniformly rejected by the courts. 
In 1893, the city council of Seguin, Texas, voted that the Sunday Sun was a 
public nuisance and thus could not be sold within the city Iimits.270 In finding 
this action unconstitutional, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stated that, 
"[t]he power to suppress one concedes the power to suppress all, whether such 
publications are political, secular, religious, decent or indecent, obscene or 
otherwise.,,271 Thus, declared the court, "[t]he power to prohibit the publication 
of newspapers is not within the compass of legislative action in this State, and 
264. Id. at 723. 
265. See City of Chicago v. Trotter, 26 N.E. 359 (III. 1891); Rich v. City of Naperville. 42 
111. App. 222 (1891). 
266. Rich, 42 III. App. at 224-25. 
267. 54 N.W. 1104 (Wis. 1893). 
268. Id. at 1107. 
269. Id. 
270. See Ex parte Neill, 22 S. W. 923 (Tex. Crim. App. 1893). 
271. Id. at 924. 
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any law enacted for that purpose would clearly be in derogation of the Bill of 
Rights." 272 
In 1908, a New York court enjoined the police ofthe city of Kingston from 
repeating their seizure and destruction of copies of the Ulster Square Dealer. 273 
While conceding that the newspaper had published "reckless and scurrilous" 
libels, the court stated, "[t]wo wrongs can never make a right.,,274 Recognizing 
the similarity between the police seizure of newspapers and a traditional prior 
restraint, the court declared: ''No one can take unto himself the right of 
suppressing in advance the publication of the printed sentiments of another 
citizen on any public or private question.,,27s 
During World War I, another New York city, Mount Vernon, voted to ban 
two papers, the New York American and the New York Evening Journal, until the 
end of the war.276 In striking down this ban, the court recognized that the ban 
constituted an impermissible prior restraint: "It would seem that the legislature 
itself ... would have no authority to prohibit in advance the plaintiff or any other 
accused person from printing and issuing newspapers or other publications."m 
In 1921, a federal court struck down the attempt by the mayor of Cleveland, 
Ohio, to ban the Dearborn Independent as tending to cause breach of peace due 
to its anti-Semitic articles.278 The court reiterated that the only remedy for 
offensive publications were prosecutions for specific offenses after publication, 
rather than "the establishment of a censorship in advance of future 
publications.,,279 Otherwise, the court declared the freedom of the press "would 
be placed at the mercy of every public official who for the moment was clothed 
with authority to preserve the public peace, and the right to a free press would 
likewise be destroyed.,,280 
272. [d. at 923-24. 
273. See Ulster Square Dealer v. Fowler, III N.Y.S. 16 (Sup. Ct. 1908). 
274. [d. at 17. 
275. [d. at 17-18. The court concluded: "The plaintiff has the right to publish a newspaper; 
and defendants cannot determine for themselves in advance as to the propriety ofthat publication 
.... " Jd. at 18. 
276. See Star Co. v. Brush, 170 N.Y.S. 987 (Sup. ct. 1918). 
277. Jd. at 990. The court quoted from an earlier New York case declaring that liberty of the 
press prevents injunctions against defamation: "Individuals are free to talk and the press is at 
liberty to publish, and neither may be restrained by injunction, but they are answerable for the abuse 
ofthis privilege in an action for slander or libel under the common law .... " [d. (quoting Stuart 
v. Press Publ'g, 82 N.Y.S. 401, 408 (App. Div. 1903». The court's finding that the ban was 
unconstitutional was affirmed on appeal. See Star Co. v. Brush, 172 N. Y. S. 851, 851-52 (App. Div. 
19] 8) (stating "[i]t is clear that such a ban on a newspaper by a city or municipality is beyond its 
powers, as it would thereby invade the constitutional rights of a free press"). 
278. See Dearborn Publ'g Co. v. Fitzgerald, 271 F. 479, 480 (N.D. Ohio ]921). 
279. Jd. at 482. 
280. Jd. at 485. 
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5. The Road to Near.-It may well be true, as many have stated, that "[s]ince 
the 1931 release of the Supreme Court's opinion in Near v. Minnesota, the 
doctrine of prior restraint has been an essential element of first amendment 
jurisprudence.,,281 However, as a review of the many cases cited in this section 
shows, the doctrine of prior restraint has been an essential element of American 
jurisprudence since the end of the Revolutionary War. If this history is ignored, 
modern commentators will overestimate the novelty of Near v. Minnesota and, 
more dangerously, underestimate the solidity of its holding. 
For one final example, consider the 1896 case from the California Supreme 
Court, Dailey v. Superior Court.282 In Dailey, a trial court had enjoined the 
showing of a play, The Crime of a Century, which was based on the facts of a 
pending murder case. The California Supreme Court ruled that such an 
injunction would be an unconstitutional prior restraint.283 The state court 
declared the injunction was invalid because the "petitioner's mouth could not be 
closed in advance for the purpose of preventing an utterance of his sentiments, 
however mischievous the prospective results of such utterance.,,284 
The road to Near was a virtual straight path from the Star Chamber and 
common law courts, through the colonial and Revolutionary period, from the 
drafting of the First Amendment through the start of the Twentieth century. 
Whatever else freedom of communication means to Americans, it has always 
included freedom from all prior restraints. Neither licensors nor governors, 
police nor judges, may attempt to halt speech before it is communicated. 
D. A Near-Great Decision 
In its landmark 1931 decision, Near v. Minnesota ex rei. Olson,285 the 
Supreme Court struck down a Minnesota law which permitted the State to obtain 
a court order abating defamatory newspapers as a nuisance.286 A state court 
issued an injunction barring The Saturday Press from publishing or distributing 
"any publication whatsoever which is a malicious, scandalous or defamatory 
newspaper, as defined by law.,,287 That state court noted that The Saturday Press 
was not barred from all publishing; it was still permitted to operate "a newspaper 
281. Scordato, supra note 2, at 2. 
282. 44 P. 458 (Cal. 1896). 
283. See id. at 460. The relevant California constitutional provision read: "Every citizen may 
freely speak, write, and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of 
that right; and no law shall be passed to restrain or abridge the liberty of speech or of the press." 
CAL. CONST. app. I, art. I, § 9. 
284. Dailey, 44 P. at 460. 
285. 283 U.S. 697 (1931). 
286. See id. at 698. 
287. [d. at712. See also FREDW. FRIENDLY, MINNESOTA RAG: lHESCANDALSHEETTHAT 
SHAPED THE CONSTITUTION (1981) (giving a classic description of The Saturday Press and the Near 
case). 
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in harmony with the public welfare to which all must yield.,,288 
The Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, ruled the law an unconstitutional prior 
restraint. The opinion by Chief Justice Hughes declared that "it has been 
generally, if not universally, considered that it is the chief purpose of the 
guaranty [of liberty of the press] to prevent previous restraints upon 
publication.,,289 Unfortunately, the Court did not attempt to define the meaning 
of the phrase "prior restraint," but instead directed attention to the statute's 
"operation and effect.,,290 Noting that the "object and effect" of the statute was 
to "suppress" future publication, the Court described the operation of the statute 
as putting ~'the publisher under an effective censorship.,,291 
The primary offending feature of the statute, according to the Court, was that 
upon a finding that a publisher had distributed a "malicious, scandalous and 
defamatory" newspaper, the "resumption of publication is punishable as a 
contempt of court by fine or imprisonment.,,292 The court's injunction, "would 
lay a permanent restraint upon the publisher, to escape which he must satisfy the 
court as to the character of a new publication.,,293 Whether future publications 
would be free from punishment would depend upon whether the publisher was 
able "to satisfy the judge that the charges are true and are published with good 
motives and for justifiable ends.,,294 This, explained the Court, "is ofthe essence 
of censorship.,,295 
The strength of the Near decision is the historical accuracy and practical 
relevance of its holding that an injunction against expression should be viewed 
as an unconstitutional prior restraint. The fact that a judge's order directed 
against the future communication of a particular speaker would have the same 
debilitating effect on free communication as the censorship of the Star 
Chamber's licensors had long been recognized in England and America, in 
numerous court decisions, and by treatise writers. Near was a declaration that 
288. Near, 283 U.S. at 712. 
289. Jd. at 713. For its description of "the conception of the liberty of the press as historically 
conceived and guaranteed," the Court cited both Blackstone and DeLolme. Jd. at 713-14. For an 
analysis of the work of both Blackstone and DeLolme, see supra notes 113-25 and accompanying 
text. 
290. [d. at 708. 
291. Jd. at 712. 
292. Jd. 
293. Jd. 
294. Jd. at 7\3. 
295. Jd. The Court made a point of declaring that the constitutional ban on prior restraints 
was not "absolutely unlimited," but was subject to limitation "only in exceptional cases." [d. at 
716. The Court listed four such cases: I) "actual obstruction to [the Government's] recruiting 
service or the publication of the sailing dates oftransports or the number and location of troops"; 
2) "the primary requirements of decency ... against obscene publications"; 3) "incitements to acts 
of violence and the overthrow by force of orderly government .... words that may have all the 
effect offorce"; 4) "to protect private rights according to the principles governing the exercise of 
the jurisdiction of courts of equity." Jd. (citations omitted). 
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such an infringement on free expression would not be permitted under the First 
Amendment. 
The primary weakness in the Near decision results from its failure to 
precisely define what constitutes a "prior restraint." Absent such a definition, the 
path of future decisions was bound to be uncertain, and respect for the doctrine 
was I iable to be transient. Indeed, many recent scholars have questioned whether 
injunctions should be treated as prior restraints at a11.296 Others have argued that 
the entire prior restraint doctrine has become "so far removed from its historic 
function, so variously invoked and discrepantly applied, and so often deflective 
of sound understanding, that it no longer warrants use as an independent category 
of First Amendment analysis."297 
Ill. USING HISTORY TO DEFINE PRIOR RESTRAINTS 
With an accurate understanding of the doctrine's history, a precise and clear 
definition of "prior restraint" is finally possible. An appropriate starting point 
is Justice Story's description of liberty of the press: "[N]either the courts of 
justice, nor other persons, are authorized to take notice of writings intended for 
the press; but are confined to those, which are printed."298 This description 
accurately captures the reality that the dangers of prior restraints can come from 
either judges or licensors. The description is not complete, though, because it 
overlooks the difference between restraints emanating from "the courts of 
justice" and those emanating from "other persons." Specifically, the description 
omits the fundamental difference between restraints imposed by the judicial as 
opposed to the executive branch of government. 
The critical element of finally solving the puzzle of defining prior restraints 
is the recognition that the same constitutional harm will necessitate different 
safeguards, when different branches of government can inflict the injury. The 
evi I of prior restraints can be inflicted by both the executive branch, through the 
discretionary granting of permits or the creation of licensing boards, and the 
judicial branch, through issuing injunctions. However, in a system of 
government where the judiciary is supreme, the methods fordealing withjudicial 
encroachment on freedom must be different from those for preventing executive 
encroachment. In particular, one of the primary ways to prevent executive 
overreaching is with judicial review. By contrast, the fundamental protection 
against judicial overreaching in our constitutional system is structural: Judicial 
action is limited to a specified role at a specified time in any particular case. The 
court does not resolve disputes that it institutes itself, only those brought by 
296. See Jeffries, supra note 3, at 419-20; Scordato, supra note 2, at 30. Not all 
commentators are ready to give up on the prior restraint doctrine. See, e.g., Blasi, supra note 3, at 
II; Hunter, supra note 3, at 293-95. 
297. Jeffries, supra note 3, at 437; see also Note, supra note 3, at 1006 (stating that 
"[w]hatever the value ofthe prior restraints doctrine in the past, it has outlived its usefulness"). 
298. STORY,SUpra note 123, § 1879, at 737. 
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either the executive branch or private parties.299 
The concept of "prior restraint," thus, has two distinct components: one 
temporal, the other embodying the principle of separation of powers. This is not 
the separation of powers principle that was at stake in the Pentagon Papers case, 
involving congressional authorization of presidential activity.30o Rather, this is 
the literal separating of power, envisioned by Madison and Montesquieu: 
"When the legislative and executive powers are united in the same 
person or body," says [Montesquieu], "there can be no liberty, because 
apprehensions may arise lest the same monarch or senate should enact 
tyrannical laws to execute them in a tyrannical manner." Again: "Were 
the power of judging joined with the legislative, the life and liberty of 
the subject would be exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would 
then be the legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge 
might behave with all the violence of an oppressor.,,301 
Each branch has a specifically delineated, independent role before 
punishment is inflicted. The "prior" in the prior restraint doctrine refers not only 
to regulatory activity which is undertaken before the specific expression is 
communicated, but also when the executive or judicial branch acts out of its 
"constitutional order" vis-a-vis the other branches of government. 
It is easier to understand what is meant by a prior restraint by starting with 
an illustration of a permissible subsequent punishment. This in no way 
contradicts the reality that in a free society most restrictions on speech, whether 
prior restraint or subsequent punishment, are unconstitutional. Because the 
doctrine of prior restraint presupposes a sphere of permissible subsequent 
punishment, though, visualizing the distinction is essential.302 In those limited 
cases where a subsequent punishment, is permitted, it must follow the traditional 
time line:303 First, the legislature enacts a general law, defining the prohibited 
speech or conduct. For states, this could also be a common law prohibition. 
Second, the speech is communicated. Third, the executive branch enforces the 
law by initiating legal proceedings, either through arresting the alleged law 
breaker or filing a complaint in court. For a private action, such as libel or 
invasion of privacy, the individual who is alleging harm institutes the legal 
proceedings. Finally, the judicial branch rules on the legality of the 
communication. This includes, but is not limited to,jury determinations ofguilt, 
299. See United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell. 330 U.S. 75. 90 (1947) ("Judicial 
adherence to the doctrine of the separation of powers preserves the courts for the decision of issues. 
between litigants. capable of effective determination."); see also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83. 97 
(1968) ("Federal judicial power is limited to those disputes which contine federal courts to a role 
consistent with a system of separated powers .... "). 
300. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). 
301. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 303 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). 
302. See. e.g., Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (referring to "the 
distinction. solidly grounded in our cases, between prior restraints and subsequent punishments"). 
303. Cf INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). 
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fault for libel, and community standards for obscenity. Upon a finding of 
illegality, the punishment for a criminal offense is imprisonment or a fine and 
damages for a civil violation. 
Fundamentally, therefore, the only permissible governmental activity 
restricting speech prior to communication is that of the legislature creating a 
general rule applying to all speakers.304 Such a rule, subject to the substantive 
limits of the First Amendment, could penalize such areas as defamation, 
obscenity, and breaches of the peace. There is no role for either the executive 
branch or the judicial branch in the creation of a general rule; both are barred 
from taking action on expression before communication. 
Once expression is communicated, the legislature, of course, has no further 
role. The next governmental actor is the Executive Branch; police may arrest and 
prosecutors or government attorneys may file complaints. In the case of private 
causes of action, such as defamation, private citizens may initiate lawsuits. 
Finally, in response to these filings, the courts may hear the case. With the 
jury making the appropriate decisions, the courts rule directly on whether the 
expression is constitutionally protected and whether it violated the law. 
With this structure in mind, we can finally give a two-part definition for prior 
restraint: (1) A "prior restraint" occurs whenever judges or executive branch 
personnel are authorized to take notice of specific expression intended for 
communication, rather than that which has actually been communicated; (2) For 
those rare cases when the Constitution permits the regulation of expression 
before it is communicated, a "prior restraint" also occurs if the judiciary can 
in itiate enforcement or the executive can make a final determ ination of illegal ity. 
The connection between separation of powers and the prior restraint doctrine 
can be completed by noting that there is one way for the legislative branch to 
impose a prior restraint directly. It could correctly be considered a prior restraint 
were the legislature to enact a law directed at silencing a particular speaker or 
banning a particular publication.30S 
In summary, the doctrine of prior restraints restricts the ability of all three 
branches of government to regulate expression. Each branch is prohibited from 
either: (a) restricting specific speech or speakers prior to communication, or (b) 
formulating or implementing rules on speech other than in that branch's 
appropriate constitutional chronological order. 
The vast majority of Supreme Court cases dealing with prior restraints fits 
comfortably within this definition. Injunctions such as those preventing the 
publication ofthe Pentagon Papers,306 or of "facts 'strongly implicative' of [an] 
304. Obviously, the general rule must precede the communication. If a general rule was 
applied to communication that had already occurred, it would be an unconstitutional ex post [acto 
law. 
305. For examples of such legislative prior restraints, see supra notes 148-53, 270-77 and 
accompanying text. Legislative action of this sort might also be regarded as an unconstitutional bill 
of attainder. 
306. See N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (197\). 
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accused,"307 would still be unconstitutional p'rior restraints. Because licensing 
schemes that give discretion to regulate expressive activity without "reasonable 
and definite standards for the officials to follow"308 prevent meaningful judicial 
review, they, too, would still be deemed unconstitutional prior restraints. 
Moreover, the procedural safeguards of Freedman v. Maryiand,309 would still be 
viewed as essential to prevent the dangers of a censorship system.310 
Certain restrictions, though, would not be treated as "prior restraints." For 
example, judicial orders limiting the speech of trial participants and of persons 
while they are inside the courtroom are so fundamentally different from classic 
prior restraints, such as restrictions against the media covering the trial, that they 
should not be considered prior restraints.311 Because of the "inherent 'equitable 
powers of courts of law over their own process, to prevent abuses, oppression, 
and injustices,"'312 restrictions inside the courtroom and applied against trial 
participants do not threaten the separation of powers. 
Similarly, many governmental employers, such as the Central Intelligence 
Agency, require their employees obtain permission before communicating with 
the public.3\3 While some courts have evaluated the constitutionality of such 
requirements against the "general presumption against prior restraints on 
speech,,,314 the restrictions on speech imposed by the executive branch on its own 
307. Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 541 (1976) (quoting the respondent judge). 
308. Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 271 (1951). 
309. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965). 
310. See id. at 58-59. 
31 1. Numerous cases from lower federal courts and state courts can be found on both sides 
ofthe question of whether to term these orders "prior restraints." See United States v. Salameh, 992 
F.2d 445, 446-47 (2d Cir. 1993); Chase v. Robson, 435 F.2d 1059, 1061 (7th Cir. 1970); Breiner 
v. Takao, 835 P.2d 637, 640-41 (Haw. 1992); Kemner v. Monsanto Co., 492 N.E.2d 1327, 1336 
(III. 1986); Twohig v. Blackmer, 918 P.2d 332 (N.M. 1996); Davenport v. Garcia, 834 S.W.2d 4, 
9-11 (Tex. 1992) (finding such an order to be a prior restraint). But cf Radio & Television News 
Ass'n ofS. Cal. v. U.S. Dist. Court for the Cent. Dist. of Cal., 781 F,2d 1443, 1446 (9th Cir. 1986); 
Chi. Council of Lawyers v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242, 248 (7th Cir. 1975) (finding such orders not to 
be a prior restraint). Some courts have even treated the exact same order as a prior restraint if 
challenged by the gagged party, but not if challenged by the media. See e.g., Dow Jones & Co. v. 
Simon, 842 F.2d 603, 609 (2nd Cir. 1988). Contra CBS, Inc. v. Young, 522 F.2d 234,239 (6th 
Cir.1975). 
312. Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20,35 (1984) (quoting Int'I Prods. Corp. v. 
Koons, 325 F.2d 403, 407-08 (2d Cir. 1963) (quoting Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U.S. 131, 145-46 
(1888)) (emphasis added». 
313. See, e.g., Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (upholding requirement that CIA 
employees obtain the Agency's prior approval before publishing information about the CIA); 
Harman v. City of New York, 140 FJd III (2d Cir. 1998) (striking down ban prohibiting 
employees of the Administration for Children's Services from speaking with the media regarding 
any activities of the agency without first obtaining permission from the agency's media relations 
department). 
314. Harman, 140 F.3d at 119; see also Zook v. Brown, 865 F.2d 887,890 (7th Cir. 1989) 
(upholding a regulation despite it being "a prior restraint on the free speech of a public employee"); 
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employees do not present the separation of powers difficulties of traditional prior 
restraints. Restrictions imposed in furtherance of the interests of "an employer 
in regulating the speech of its employees,,3ls simply do not encroach on the law-
making function of the legislative branch. 
Although judicial orders against trial participants and government 
employment contracts should not be considered "prior restraints," they are still 
subject to the stringent commands ofthe First Amendment. The Supreme Court 
held that a ban on disclosing discovery information needed to further a 
"substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression," 
and must limit, "First Amendment freedoms no greater than is necessary.,,316 
Similarly, courts uphold limits on the speech of government employees if the 
speech interests both of employees and of their potential audiences are 
"outweighed by that expression's 'necessary impact on the actual operation' of 
the Government.,,317 The prior restraint doctrine is not the only means to protect 
free expression. 
CONCLUSION 
There is much to be learned from the neglected history ofthe prior restraint 
doctrine. From English common law, to colonial times, to the drafting of the 
First Amendment, it was understood that no government official was to have 
power over speakers prior to communication. Throughout the Nineteenth 
century, judges equated injunctions against defamatory statements with prior 
restraint and equated prior restraints with the absence of freedom. Thus, the 
Supreme Court correctly held in Near that an injunction against speech should 
be treated as a prior restraint. 
The most important lesson from history, though, is the need to incorporate 
the concept of separation of powers into the definition of prior restraints. The 
evil of prior restraints can be caused by different branches of government, the 
judicial as well as the executive branch. The structure of our constitutional 
system provides different safeguards for preventing each branch from abusing its 
power. With a proper definition of "prior restraint," we will be able to ensure 
that prior restraints are forever treated as ''the most serious and the least tolerable 
infringement on First Amendment rights."318 
prior restraint"); Spain v. City of Mansfield, 915 F. Supp. 919, 923 (N.D. Ohio 1996); Zook v. 
Brown, 865 F.2d 887, 890 (7th Cir. 1989) (upholding a regulation despite it be.ing "a prior restraint 
on the free speech ofa public employee") (same). 
315. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563,568 (1968). 
316. Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 32 (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 413 
(1974». 
317. United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454, 468 (1995) (quoting 
Pickering, 391 U.S. at 571) (striking down a ban on federal employees receiving honoraria for 
appearances, speeches, or articles). This balancing test applies only when the employee speaks "as 
a citizen upon matters of public concern" rather than "as an employee upon matters only of personal 
interest." Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983). 
318. Neb. Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976). 
